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Welfare as Happiness
John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur†
INTRODUCTION
When people write laws, what do they hope to accomplish?
One view is that laws are written to drive people toward moral
behavior or to embody an objective ideal of what is right. Whether or
not those claims have merit, most would agree that another
objective—making people‟s lives better—is also at minimum a major
goal of law. Improving the quality of life might not be the only thing
that matters, but such improvement is desirable. Indeed, improving
people‟s lives is the explicit focus of much of the policymaking and
regulatory work done by our government.
If it is true that an important goal of legal policy is to make life
better, then the next question is what “better” means. For the past
hundred years, the dominant view has been that the way to improve
someone‟s life is to make her more able to get what she wants. 1 This
“preference satisfaction” approach, which is most closely associated
with economics but also enjoys preeminence in both law and
philosophy, is “[a]s of now, the theory to beat.”2 Nonetheless, in the
past two decades, a rival account known as virtue ethics has gained
widespread attention.3 Drawing on the work of Aristotle, virtue ethics
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1
DANIEL M. HAYBRON, THE PURSUIT OF UNHAPPINESS: THE ELUSIVE
PSYCHOLOGY OF WELL-BEING 34 (2008) (“The dominant account among economists
and philosophers over the last century or so . . . identifies well-being with the
satisfaction of the individual‟s desires.”).
2
Id.
3
Id. at 35 (“Aristotelian theories . . . have stirred considerable interest since the
revival of virtue ethics and the rise of the Sen-Nussbaum capabilities approach in
political theory.”). See also Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice, 51 AM. J. JURIS.
65 (2006); Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of
Judging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 179 (2003).
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holds that the quality of someone‟s life depends on the extent to which
she does well the things that it is characteristically human to do.4
In this Article, we articulate and defend a definition of wellbeing or quality of life that differs from both of those leading
accounts. We argue that well-being is neither preference-satisfaction
nor nature-fulfillment but rather happiness or positive affect—feeling
good. A person‟s well-being is the aggregate of how she feels
throughout her life. This definition captures more directly and
naturally the concept of well-being than do the alternatives, and it
stands up better to analytical scrutiny.
The intuitive appeal of our approach is so strong that one might
wonder why it has not already gained broad acceptance. One part of
the answer may be that positive and negative feelings are thought to be
invisible, inaccessible, and unmeasurable.5 Policymakers who aim to
improve lives must focus on something tangible and easily observed.
Nature-fulfillment and especially preference-satisfaction fit the bill
because both focus on external activity: the things people do and the
choices they make. Happiness, by contrast, is internal: how can we
know how a person feels?
This concern about measuring happiness has been addressed by
recent groundbreaking research in the fields of psychology and
neurobiology, pioneered by Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman and
others. The research provides a sophisticated means of measuring and
analyzing people‟s positive and negative feelings. We have previously
explored the implications of this research for both criminal and civil
law,6 and we now use it as a means of defining and pursuing one of
law‟s central goals.
If we are right that happiness constitutes well-being, then law
and public policy should turn their attention in that direction insofar as
they aim to improve people‟s lives. Economists have heavily
influenced law and policy to increase people‟s capacity to satisfy their
preferences. Instead, the focus should be on increasing subjective
well-being. We will illustrate how the new research makes this
4

HAYBRON, supra note 1, at 35 (identifying “nature-fulfillment” as the common
feature of eudaimonistic accounts of well-being).
5
See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
6
John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, & Jonathan S. Masur, Happiness and
Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009); John Bronsteen, Christopher
Buccafusco, & Jonathan S. Masur, Hedonic Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil
Lawsuits, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1516 (2008).
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objective possible and realistic to achieve. To that end, we introduce a
new, subjectively oriented decision tool—well-being analysis (WBA).
In Part I, we explain our view of welfare and the boundaries of
our claims about welfare relative to other possible goals of law and
policy. We also describe the methods of measuring happiness, as well
as what we take happiness itself to entail. In Part II, we contrast
happiness with Aristotelian virtue ethics; and in Part III, we contrast
happiness with the preference-satisfaction approach (in particular, a
refined version of this approach that we take to be the most plausible
and persuasive example of it). In Part IV, we explain how
governments that currently use the economic tool of cost-benefit
analysis could instead perform WBA no less easily or effectively.
To the extent that our society aims to make human life better, it
should focus on making people happier. This Article argues for that
position and sets out a preliminary blueprint for pursuing it.
I. A HAPPINESS-BASED APPROACH TO WELL-BEING
We take up four initial tasks in this first Part. One is to note
the limitations of the claim we are making. Unlike utilitarians, we do
not argue that well-being or quality of life is all that should matter to
individuals and governments. We argue only that well-being is
important, and that it is happiness7 that constitutes well-being. To
whatever extent a society decides it wants to increase quality of life,
the way to do so is to increase happiness. In the second and third
sections, we make the initial case that happiness is what constitutes a
person‟s quality of life. (We defend the conceptual superiority of this
approach over the leading alternatives in Parts II and III.) The second
section notes that the experience of life is wholly sensory and
concludes that improving the feeling of those sensory experiences is
the only way to improve someone‟s life. The third section elaborates
on the nature of positive and negative emotions. Finally, the fourth
section discusses the new psychological tools for measuring
happiness. These tools not only give us insight into the nature of
7

We use interchangeably the terms “happiness,” “positive affect,” “positive
mental states,” and “feeling good.” In Part I.B., infra, we argue that an individual‟s
aggregated happiness—the sum of that individual‟s experiences over time—is the
appropriate measure of that individual‟s “subjective well-being”: her overall
subjectively felt experience. We then proceed to use “subjective well-being”
interchangeably with “happiness.”
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people‟s experience of life, but also enable us to analyze policy
through the lens of its effects on well-being.8
A.

Weak Welfarism

Economists and utilitarian philosophers occupy such a central
place in the literature on well-being that, to avoid confusion, we will
take a moment to make explicit the difference between our claims and
those of traditional welfarism or utilitarianism. Whereas those
theories deem well-being9 the only thing of value and seek to
maximize the overall amount of it, we make a more limited
contention. Like the “weak welfarism” of Matthew Adler and Eric
Posner,10 our approach is open to the possibility that things other than
overall human welfare could have value. Examples include “moral
rights, the fair distribution of welfare, and even moral considerations
wholly detached from welfare, such as intrinsic environmental
values.”11
We advocate only that a policymaker treat an increase in
welfare as a positive thing, potentially to be weighed against other
sorts of values. We view this claim as relatively uncontroversial and
will treat it as little more than an assumption or axiom.12 The contrary
view that welfare is not desirable—that there is no value in pursuing it
even where all else is equal—is strongly at odds with standard
intuitions and would likely produce policy results deemed
unacceptable by most.13
8

We flesh out that idea in Part IV.
We use the words well-being, welfare, and utility interchangeably as labels for
that which is good for a person—that which makes her life better. Our argument is
that happiness (defined as positive mental states, or subjectively feeling good)
constitutes that thing (well-being, welfare, utility, or that which is good for a
person).
10
E.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS 52-61 (2006).
11
Id. at 53.
12
See Mark Kelman, Hedonic Psychology and the Ambiguities of “Welfare”, 33
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 391, 391 (2005) (“Philosophers have disagreed about the place of
human welfare in judgments about public policies generally and their distributive
outcomes in particular. But virtually all agree that welfare effects should play some
role, at least when welfare improvements can be achieved without violating „side
constraints.‟”).
13
Indeed, even the leading critics of utilitarianism value welfare and thus do not
oppose our suggestion that it be counted as a good for the purposes of policymaking.
9
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Happiness and the Subjective Experience of Life

Like any animal, a person experiences life wholly through
sensory perception of the world. The person, in turn, is constituted by
a set of physiological processes in her mind and body. All thoughts,
feelings, and actions are, at bottom, a function of these processes.14
Some of a person‟s experiences of life are negative, whereas
others are positive. Touching a burning stove and recoiling in pain
would be a typical negative experience, whereas eating a chocolatechip cookie and feeling a sensation of pleasure would be a typical
positive one. Even higher-order experiences, such as reading a book
or thinking about a loved one, produce cognitive or emotional
sensations in a person‟s brain that the individual registers as positive
or negative; either the individual is enjoying the book, or she is not.
Because these sorts of experienced moments constitute a person‟s
life,15 and because each moment is positive or negative for the person
depending on her physiological experience of it (i.e., how it makes her
feel), these feelings make up the subjective quality of a life. They
determine whether someone experiences her own life as positive or
negative. What it means for something to be a bad experience for an
individual is for it to make the individual feel bad. Negative feelings
define bad life experiences, whereas positive feelings define good
ones.16
It could be argued that whether a moment is positive or
negative for a person does not depend solely on that person‟s
physiological experience of it. Indeed, disagreeing with our thesis
may well require such an argument. But what else could make it
positive or negative? A person‟s experience of the world is
E.g., Michael S. Moore, Torture and the Balance of Evils, 23 ISR. L. REV. 280, 33132 (1989).
14
Our approach to these issues is derived from our commitment to materialist or
naturalist explanations of human behavior. See OWEN FLANAGAN, THE REALLY
HARD PROBLEM: MEANING IN THE MATERIAL WORLD (2007). For a discussion of
naturalism in legal philosophy, see BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE:
ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
(2007).
15
By this we mean that life is simply a collection of all of its moments.
16
We qualify this point a bit later in this section. A negative experience can, for
example, increase welfare in the long run by decreasing the likelihood of more
negative experiences.
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exclusively physiological,17 and when in any moment someone has a
positive or negative feeling, that feeling is her physiological
experience of the moment.
Unless she has other feelings
18
simultaneously, nothing else can comprise the experience for her
because her feelings are the sum total of the way that she experiences
life.
C.

Welfare as Happiness

We equate human welfare with the subjective, individual
experience of positive feeling. On this view, the correct measure of
welfare for a period of any duration, from a couple of minutes to an
entire lifetime, is the aggregate of a person‟s moment-by-moment
experiences of positive and negative feeling. This account of wellbeing as moment-by-moment affect owes much to Daniel Kahneman‟s
work on “objective happiness.”19 As a person progresses through life,
her various experiences are associated with different emotional states
some of which will be positive, while others will be negative, neutral,
or a combination of positive and negative.
This association occurs across the spectrum of emotions.20 For
example, positive feelings of love, joy, and awe might feel different
from one another, but they hold in common a sensation of positivity—
being drawn to the feeling rather than away from it.21 Moreover, the
various activities that a person engages in, from playing sports to
dining with friends to making judgments about her life satisfaction, are
each attended by positive or negative emotions. In terms of happiness,
17

We mean “physiological” in the broad sense of the word, including of course
mental and emotional feelings. They, too, are produced by physical processes within
the body. See ANTONIO DAMASIO, THE FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS: BODY AND
EMOTION IN THE MAKING OF CONSCIOUSNESS (1999).
18
If so, then all of these feelings would be part of her level of happiness and
therefore her well-being and quality of life.
19
Daniel Kahneman, Experienced Utility and Objective Happiness: A MomentBased Approach, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 673 (Daniel Kahneman &
Amos Tversky eds., 2000) (hereinafter Experienced Utility); Daniel Kahneman,
Objective Happiness, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC
PSYCHOLOGY 3 (Daniel Kahneman et al., eds. 1999) (hereinafter Objective
Happiness).
20
See JAY SCHULKIN, BODILY SENSIBILITY: INTELLIGENT ACTION 14 (2004)
(“Behavioral systems are organized for approach and exploration and to avoid and
reject objects.”).
21
Id.; Kahneman, Experienced Utility, supra note 19, at 683.
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there is thus a commensurability among varying feelings and in turn
the activities that influence those feelings.22 People make these kinds
of comparisons whenever they decide how to spend their time, and the
well-being measures discussed below enable the measurement of the
emotion people actually experience while doing different things.23
Because we define well-being as subjectively felt experience, it
follows that its ideal measure is one that perfectly tracks how people
feel over time. Whether or not such perfection could theoretically be
achieved by a device that constantly measured internal processes such
as brain activity, at the moment we must settle for a proxy. We
analyze and compare the available proxies in the section that follows.
D.

Measuring Happiness

More than a century ago, the economist Francis Edgeworth
proposed the possibility of developing a “hedonimeter” to measure the
changes in pleasure and pain that an individual experiences.24 Before
such a tool could have been developed, however, it was rendered
superfluous by the paradigm shift in economic theory toward the
rational choice assumption that people naturally choose what makes
them happy. In gauging people‟s welfare, economists could simply
look to the decisions that people made between different choices on
the assumption that if they chose state A over state B, it was because A
provided them more utility than B. This approach has been labeled
“decision utility.”25
Although direct measurement of welfare fell out of favor with
mainstream economics throughout much of the twentieth century,
some pockets of social science research kept the tradition alive,
including the determination of Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs)
that compare the value of living a given number of years in normal

22

See Kahneman, Objective Happiness, supra note 19, at 8 (“…it appears that
most moments of experience can be adequately characterized by a single summary
value on the [Good-Bad] dimension”).
23
See Kahneman, Experienced Utility, supra note 19, at 683.
24
FRANCIS Y. EDGEWORTH, MATHEMATICAL PSYCHICS: AN ESSAY ON THE
APPLICATION OF MATHEMATICS TO THE MORAL SCIENCES 98 (C. Kagan Paul & Co.,
London 1881). On Edgeworth, see David Colander, Edgeworth’s Hedonimeter and
the Quest to Measure Utility, 21 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 215 (2007).
25
See Daniel Kahneman et al., Back to Bentham: Explorations of Experienced
Utility, 112 Q. J. ECON. 375, 375 (1997).
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health with years of survival in disabling health conditions.26 In
addition, objective indicators of welfare, including GDP, infant
mortality, and literacy, grew in popularity during this period. Not until
the 1980s, however, did subjective assessments of well-being
reemerge as acceptable tools for measuring happiness. Since then, the
variety of techniques available to researchers has expanded
considerably.27 In contrast to economic models, these tools enable
measurement of “experience utility,” or the well-being that people
actually feel.28
There are now a wide variety of available measures that
purport to gauge well-being. In the sections that follow, we argue that
of these, the best proxy for actual subjective well-being (and thus for
human welfare) is the moment-by-moment experience sampling
method.29 Sampling methods do the best job of measuring the
essential constituents of welfare (i.e., momentary affect), and they
substantially minimize many of the assessment concerns associated
with other techniques. In addition, we provide evidence that the
various happiness measures are substantially correlated with one
another and with external reports of well-being. Finally, we briefly
review some of hedonic psychology‟s key findings and their
implications for enhancing social welfare.
1.

Experience Sampling Assessments

Even as a theoretical matter, we cannot know whether
psychologists will ever be able to measure a person‟s well-being
purely through a physiological analysis of what is occurring within her
brain and body. In any event, the current state of neuroscience is such
that our best approach to learning how someone feels is simply to ask
her. There are different ways to ask, though, and a breakthrough in
social science has been the commitment to asking specific questions
about an experience during the experience.
In recent years
26

See M.C. WEINSTEIN & H.V. FINEBERG, CLINICAL DECISION MAKING (1980).
See William Pavot, The Assessment of Subjective Well-Being: Successes and
Shortfalls, in THE SCIENCE OF SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING 124, 124 (Michael Eid &
Randy J. Larsen eds., 2008).
28
See Kahneman et al., supra note 25, at 375. Strictly speaking, a number of
the survey methods discussed below measure “remembered utility” or how people
felt. Nonetheless, they are qualitatively different from preference-based approaches
to welfare that focus on anticipated emotion.
29
See infra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
27
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psychologists have created a number of “ecological” assessments to
measure the happiness associated with various events while they are
occurring.30 While these techniques can be used to measure the (less
useful) cognitive assessments of well-being,31 they are particularly
valuable for their contribution to measures of moment-by-moment
affect. The experience sampling method (ESM), for example, uses
palmtop computers to signal subjects randomly throughout their day.32
When they receive a signal, subjects use the computers to indicate the
activity they are engaged in and how they feel about it.33 With
technological advances and the ubiquity of palmtop computers,
BlackBerries, and text messaging, it may soon be possible to develop
large-scale indices of happiness based on regularly collected data from
many of a given country‟s citizens.34
Unlike surveys that ask subjects to record their satisfaction
with life as a whole,35 these moment-by-moment techniques minimize
many of the measurement errors associated with memory and
aggregation biases.36 And while life satisfaction measures might cover
broad swaths of experiences, momentary affect scales enable
researchers to detect changes in emotion associated with narrower

30

See JOEL M. HEKTNER ET AL., EXPERIENCE SAMPLING METHOD: MEASURING
QUALITY OF EVERYDAY LIFE (2007); Arthur A. Stone et al., Ecological
Momentary Assessment, in WELL-BEING, supra note 19, at 26.
31
We discuss these measures in Part I.D.2, infra.
32
See Christie N. Scollon et al., Experience Sampling: Promises and Pitfall,
Strengths and Weaknesses, 4 J. HAPPINESS STUD. 5 (2003).
33
Id. Another technique, the day reconstruction method (DRM), asks
participants to recall the activities of the previous day, isolate them into separate
episodes, and assign each episode various emotional ratings. See Daniel Kahneman
et al., A Survey Method for Characterizing Daily Life Experience: The Day
Reconstruction Method, 306 SCI. 1776, 1776 (2004) (hereinafter DRM).
34
See Ed Diener, Subjective Well-Being: The Science of Happiness and a
Proposal for a National Index, 55 AM. PSYCHOL. 34, 40 (2000) (“I propose that the
United States needs indicators of SWB that can be used to track happiness over time.
Ideally, these indicators would include ESMs of nationally representative samples of
respondents. National ESM surveys could provide valuable information on how
frequently and intensely people feel satisfied and happy in various life circumstances
and across types of situations.”) So far, Bhutan is the only country to have adopted a
National Happiness Index. Andrew C. Revkin, A New Measure of Well-Being From
a Happy Little Kingdom, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2005, at F1.
35
See Part I.D.2, infra.
36
See Daniel Kahneman & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Utility Maximization
and Experienced Utility, 20 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 221, 227-29 (2006).
THE
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experiences.37 Importantly, these narrower experiences are more
likely to be the focus of legal policy. In addition, momentary scales
do not ignore the importance people may place on holistic satisfaction
judgments. Such judgments are associated with positive or negative
affect,38 and a sufficiently fine-grained moment-by-moment measure
of affect will detect them.39 Finally, because momentary measures can
reduce each experience to a one-dimensional assessment of affect,
taken over a particular duration, they allow for cardinal, rather than
merely ordinal, comparisons of well-being. Accordingly, we believe
that these sampling methods currently provide the best proxies for
well-being.
2.

Life Satisfaction Surveys

The earliest and still most consistently used method for
subjective assessment of well-being is the personal survey of life
satisfaction.40 Although surveys can be used to measure various
aspects of subjective well-being, they often rely on general questions
like: “Taken as a whole, how satisfied are you with your life these
days?”41 Because these scales tend to have relatively few items, they
can easily be combined with large-scale general population surveys
that obtain data on many aspects of respondents‟ life circumstances.42
This allows for analysis of the correlation between life satisfaction
and demographic data such as age, wealth, health, family life, and
37

See Daniel Kahneman & Robert Sugden, Experienced Utility as a Standard of
Policy Evaluation, 32 Environmental & Resource Econ. 161, 174 (2005)..
38
See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
39
Kelman suggests that the “higher-order meaning people attach to life
experience” will be missed by momentary affect measures. See Kelman, supra note
12, at 406. While this might be true with the relatively coarse measurement
techniques currently available to researchers, it is not conceptually true. Under our
account, higher-order judgments are affect-laden experiences of certain duration just
like active or sensory experiences.
Accordingly, the time people spend
contemplating their lives and the emotions associated with those thoughts would be
captured by an ideally fine-grained measure of momentary well-being.
40
See Ed Diener, Myths in the Science of Happiness, and Directions for Future
Research, in THE SCIENCE OF SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING, supra note 27, at 508.
41
The Satisfaction with Life Scale is a widely used five-item scale used to
assess an individual‟s overall life satisfaction. See William Pavot & Ed Diener,
Review of the Satisfaction with Life Scale, 5 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 164 (1993).
42
See Pavot, supra note 27, at 128-9 (The Satisfaction with Life Scale “offers
very good internal consistency and temporal reliability, yet it is brief and easily
incorporated into a larger research design.” Id.
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employment. Initially, life satisfaction surveys utilized cross-sectional
analyses, for example by contrasting the self-reported well-being of
married people with unmarried people.43 More recently, however,
researchers have turned to extensive longitudinal life satisfaction
surveys that track individuals over a period of years.44 Longitudinal
studies allow researchers to match individuals‟ entry into a particular
life circumstance (such as marriage) with changes in their life
satisfaction, thus isolating the effect of the change and diminishing the
effects of selection and unobserved variables.45
Life satisfaction surveys require respondents to reflect on their
experiences, to combine the way those experiences made them feel,
and to assign a score to the aggregate emotion. Although these
surveys may in some circumstances serve as reasonable proxies for
subjective well-being (a point we return to below), they can be
affected by participants‟ cognitive and emotional biases.46 General,
abstract surveys, such as life satisfaction surveys, suffer from two
other dangers.47 One is that people might forget how they felt during
an experience if they are asked at a later time, and the other is that
people might make mistakes in trying to aggregate different moments
of experience.48 For example, recent research has shown that instead
of aggregating the sum of their hedonic response to an event, people
tend to calculate the event‟s effect by averaging only the peak
response and the end response.49 This leads to lower hedonic reports
for a four-minute negative experience than for the same experience
with a one-minute period of slightly less painful experience appended

43

For a review of such studies, see Michael Argyle, Causes and Correlates of
Happiness, in WELL-BEING, supra note 19, at 359-62.
44
See, e.g., Richard. E. Lucas et al., Reexamining Adaptation and the Set Point
Model of Happiness: Reactions to Changes in Marital Status, 84 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 527 (2003); Andrew E. Clark et al., Lags and Leads in Life
Satisfaction: A Test of the Baseline Hypothesis, 118 ECON. J. F222, F231 (2008);
Richard A. Lucas, Time Does Not Heal All Wounds: A Longitudinal Study of
Reaction and Adaptation to Divorce, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 945 (2005).
45
See Lucas et al., supra note 44, at 527.
46
See Kahneman et al., DRM, supra note 33, at 1777.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
See Kahneman & Thaler, supra note 36, at 227-29 (2006). They find that
people‟s ratings of a hedonic experience seem to be based on an average of the most
intense aspect of the experience (the peak) and the final aspects of the experience
(the end).
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to it.50 Concerns about such biased responses to surveys motivated
researchers to develop well-being assessments that measured
responses in close to real time.51
Nonetheless, life satisfaction surveys can have value as an
inexpensive proxy for more refined measures of well-being, especially
to the extent that their reliability can be tested by the level of
correlation with ESM studies.
3.

Reliability and Validity

Despite the fact that moment-by-moment measures of wellbeing are more reliable than holistic life satisfaction inquiries, it is
noteworthy that these different measures of well-being correlate
strongly with one another. Overall life satisfaction is correlated both
with the amount of positive and negative affect that a person feels52
and with her satisfaction with the domains of her life.53 In addition,
subjective reports of well-being are strongly correlated with one
another and with external measures such as third-party informant
reports,54 facial expressions,55 and neurological data.56 These facts
lend credence to the notion that “happiness” is a valid, distinct
construct, and one that moment-by-moment measures of affect are
capable of capturing fully.
Well-being measures also tend to be fairly stable over time and
exhibit high test-retest reliability.57 But despite their overall stability,58
50

Id.
See Kahneman et al., DRM, supra note 33, at 1777.
52
Michael Eid & Ed Diener, Global judgments of subjective well-being:
Situational variability and long-term stability, 65 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 245
(2004).
53
See Ulrich Schimmack, The Structure of Subjective Well-Being, in THE
SCIENCE OF SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING, supra note 27, at 115.
54
See E. Sandvik et al., Subjective Well-Being: The Convergence and Stability
of Self-Report and Non-Self-Report Measures, 61 J. PERSONALITY 317 (1993); Heidi
Lepper, Use of Other-Reports to Validate Subjective Well-Being Measures, 44 SOC.
INDICATORS RES. 367 (1998).
55
Tiffany A. Ito & John T. Cacioppo, The Psychophysiology of Utility
Appraisals, in WELL-BEING, supra note 19, at 479.
56
Id.; T.G. Dinan, Glucocorticoids and the Genesis of Depressive Illness: A
Psychobiological Model, 164 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 365 (1994).
57
See Ed Diener & Richard E. Lucas, Personality and Subjective Well-Being, in
WELL-BEING, supra note 19, at 213, 214.
58
See Sandvik, supra note 54.
51

Welfare as Happiness

13

they are also sensitive to changes in circumstance such that people
who experience apparently negative events do indeed report lower
levels of well-being (at least for a time).59 This implies that people are
capable of consistently reporting how experiences make them feel, and
that their emotional responses generally exhibit predictable patterns
following specific events.
4.

Hedonic Psychology‟s Key Findings

Using the techniques discussed above, researchers have been
able to study the kinds of things that make people happy, the intensity
and duration of people‟s affective responses, and their ability to
predict what will make them happy. Although some of their findings
are relatively unsurprising, others are highly counterintuitive. This
research, along with work on cognitive and emotional biases in
decision-making, has challenged the economists‟ assumption that
people regularly choose what will make them happy.
Hedonic psychology has consistently shown that well-being is
based considerably less on individual life circumstances than had
previously been thought.60 For example, increases in wealth are only
weakly correlated with feelings of positive affect,61 and people who
become disabled often experience a noteworthy rebound in their
happiness within a couple of years.62 Well-being‟s relative resilience
in the face of these kinds of external circumstances is likely due to
people‟s ability to adapt hedonically to life events.63 Although
hedonic adaptation‟s effects are substantial, studies show that people
do a poor job of remembering and anticipating adaptation.
Accordingly, they tend to be unsuccessful at predicting certain aspects
of an event‟s hedonic impact.64 Psychologists refer to these failures as
59

See Lucas et al. supra note 44.
See Kahneman, DRM, supra note 33, at 1778.
61
See id.
62
For a review, see Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein, Hedonic
Adaptation, in WELL-BEING, supra note 19, at 312.
63
Id.
64
See Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting: Knowing
What to Want, 14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 131 (2005); Peter A. Ubel
et al., Disability and Sunshine: Can Hedonic Predictions Be Improved by Drawing
Attention to Focusing Illusions or Emotional Adaptation?, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 111, 111 (2005) (“One of the most commonly replicated
„happiness gaps‟ is that observed between the self-rated quality of life of people with
60
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affective forecasting errors,65 and they seem to exist both for rare
occurrences and for mundane ones66
In addition to the difficulties people face making decisions
about which choices will make them most happy, their predictions are
further handicapped by a variety of emotional and cognitive biases that
affect judgment. For example, the decision-making context plays a
considerable role in the choices that people make.67 Their decisions
are affected by their moods, situational factors, and the way their
choices are framed.68 Instead of being expert utility maximizers, in
many cases people are at best boundedly rational. These findings,
combined with the research on happiness and affective forecasting,
call into question the assumption that people regularly choose the
things that make them happy. The findings thus decouple happiness
and preference-satisfaction.
*

*

*

In this Part, we have made the positive case for understanding
welfare as subjective well-being, and we have analyzed the
psychological tools available for measuring it. Although increasing
welfare is not the only conceivable goal of legal policy, it is widely
regarded as one of the most important of such goals. To the extent
that states seek to increase welfare they should promote subjective
well-being—the aggregate of subjectively experienced moment-bymoment affect. Although a number of potentially acceptable proxies
for well-being exist, those that rely on momentary assessment of
experienced happiness are conceptually closest and empirically most
valid. Having made this initial case, in the Parts that follow we defend
our conception of well-being from its strongest competitors.

health conditions and healthy people‟s estimates of what their quality of life would
be if they had those conditions . . . .”).
65
Wilson & Gilbert, supra note 64, at 131.
66
See Peter Ayton et al., Affective Forecasting: Why Can’t People Predict
Their Emotions?, 13 THINKING & REASONING 62 (2007).
67
See George Loewenstein et al., Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility,
118 Q. J. ECON. 1209 (2003).
68
See Christopher K. Hsee et al., Hedonomics: Bridging Decision Research with
Happiness Research, 3 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 224, 231-37 (2008).
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II. HAPPINESS, VIRTUE ETHICS, AND OBJECTIVE LISTS
Our thesis is that human well-being is defined by the
aggregation of moment-by-moment positive affect throughout a
lifetime. For something to benefit a person is for it to increase that
aggregated affect—to make the person experience more positive
feeling than she would otherwise have experienced.
Two features of our approach should be emphasized. First,
well-being depends solely on how a person feels rather than on any
other (e.g., more objective) consideration or fact. A person has wellbeing to the extent that she is happy, regardless of the objective
conditions of her life. Second, well-being can be influenced only by
those things that affect a person‟s experience of life. Anything that is
outside this veil of experience and has no effects on it is irrelevant to
the quality of a person‟s life.
The first feature means that someone who is poor but happy is
better off than someone who is rich but unhappy. Even someone who
is oppressed but happy has more well-being than someone who is free
but unhappy. The second feature means that a person‟s happiness is
unaffected by things she is unaware of, as long as they do not affect
her experience of life. A happy person is better off than an unhappy
one, even if her happiness is based on mistaken beliefs about her life.
A spouse‟s secret infidelity does not affect one‟s well-being unless one
learns of it or otherwise experiences it as part of one‟s own life (e.g.,
being treated differently by the spouse or others). We will discuss
these examples in more detail in the final section of this Part.
To defend our conception of welfare, we will contrast it with
the leading alternatives. This Part discusses two related categories of
alternatives: objective-list (or “capabilities”) approaches, and virtue
ethics. The capabilities approach is attributable primarily to Amartya
Sen and Martha Nussbaum, whereas virtue ethics revives the work of
Aristotle and other ancient Greek philosophers. We consider each
category in turn, then defend our theory against its most important
criticisms.
A.

Capabilities-Based Conceptions of Welfare

Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen have argued that a
person‟s welfare is defined by whether the person possesses a
particular sett of capabilities. For example, someone who lives in a
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society that recognizes the right of free speech is better off than is
someone who lives in a society denying that freedom, all else being
equal. For Nussbaum, well-being depends solely upon having the
capabilities, regardless whether the person actually uses them. For
Sen, well-being depends upon not just having the capabilities but also
using them.
We reject both approaches as being insufficiently attentive to
the subjective nature of well-being. Sen‟s view is particularly
vulnerable to this criticism. Consider a person who prefers not to
make use of her capabilities because she correctly believes that using
them will make her miserable. Sen must defend the proposition that if
she uses them and is miserable, then she is better off than if she does
not use them and is happy. That is an objective judgment about her
well-being: on Sen‟s account, what is good for her is disconnected
from what she wants or how she feels.
The problem with this view is that well-being is inherently
subjective, not objective. The miserable person who uses her
capabilities cannot reasonably be deemed better off than the happy
person who does not. It is not clear what the metaphysical basis for
Sen‟s alternative objective judgment would be; and if the judgment
relies upon intuition, it comes up short by that yardstick when pitted
against our happiness-based conception of welfare. It grates strongly
against standard intuitions to say that a person who constantly feels
awful possesses great well-being because she happens to be engaged
in activities that appear on a list made by others.
One might ask why such a person would choose freely to
engage in such activities, but that choice is not hard to understand.
Perhaps she feels compelled to do so by psychological factors such as
a desire to please others or to fulfill a cultural conception of success.
Or perhaps she believes incorrectly that those activities will make her
happy. Regardless, the hypothesis is that if she resisted or freed
herself from her internal reasons for choosing to use her capabilities,
then she would be happier. Assuming this hypothesis to be true, we
regard it as intuitively obvious that she would then be better off.
It might well be, of course, that using the listed capabilities
would in fact make most people happy. But the test of Sen‟s theory
versus ours is what happens when happiness and capabilities are
disconnected—i.e., when someone is made less happy (even
miserable) by using her capabilities. In such a case, does well-being
follow happiness or the use of the capabilities? We see no reason that
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someone‟s well-being could depend upon objective factors that are
irrelevant to her personal experience of life or that affect her
experience in an exclusively negative way. Such a view does not take
seriously enough the point that an individual‟s well-being is hers.
What is best for her cannot be determined independently of what she
likes, of what brings her positive emotions like joy and contentment.
What is best for her is bound up inextricably with her feelings and her
experience of life. She, not the list-makers, lives her life; and her
experience of it as positive or negative is the ultimate yardstick by
which her welfare must be measured. A theory that denies these
points cannot ultimately be squared with the considered
understandings of well-being.
Our objection to Nussbaum‟s approach is similar, although we
hasten to acknowledge that she insulates herself from some of the
above problems by emphasizing the political nature of her
prescriptions.
Nussbaum wants the state to give people the
opportunity to use the listed capabilities, and she is open to continuous
reevaluation of the list‟s contents. Nevertheless, she has a similarly
objective conception of welfare: the freedom and capacity to use the
listed capabilities, whether or not one chooses to use them.
The problem with this approach is simply a more subtle, onelevel-removed version of the problem with Sen‟s approach. Imagine a
person who does not care at all about having these capabilities and
whose life would be no different, in terms of what matters to her, if
she had them or not. To be sure, Nussbaum is not imposing anything
on that person; Nussbaum is not requiring the person to do anything.
Yet Nussbaum is claiming that facts utterly irrelevant to the person
nonetheless define that person‟s level of well-being.
How can that be? Why would someone benefit from a thing
that does not affect her life at all, or that does not affect it positively in
terms of her own experience of life? To view a miserable person with
these capabilities as having greater well-being than a happy person
without them is to privilege an outsider‟s conception of what is good
for these individuals over the feelings and wishes of the individuals
themselves. What claim can that outsider have to speak for these
people, who judge their lives by a different metric?
A person‟s well-being is determined by her own experience,
not by some objective assessment of the conditions under which that
experience takes place. Those conditions matter only if they matter to
her. Nussbaum‟s account runs contrary to that bedrock consideration.
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Nature-Fulfillment Conceptions of Welfare

Although there is disagreement about the views of Aristotle
and other ancient Greek philosophers, a group of current philosophers
identify as neo-Aristotelians and endorse a view of welfare labeled
virtue ethics. The central claim tends to be that a persons‟ well-being
is defined by the extent to which she does well those activities that it is
characteristically human to do. Such nature-fulfillment constitutes
flourishing human behavior and, therefore, welfare.
Not much needs to be said about this view beyond our
objections to the capabilities approach. Like that approach, naturefulfillment is hamstrung by its inability to accord sufficient value to
the subjective experience of life. Doing a characteristic activity well
would probably make the person doing it feel good, but if it did not do
so—if for example it made her miserable, and if she did not value it—
then why would the activity nonetheless have increased her wellbeing?
Moreover, there is serious disagreement about the qualities
characteristic of a human being and even about whether the concept of
characteristic qualities may be applied accurately to human beings at
all.69 If there are such qualities, then some of them might not be ones
that Aristotelians or anyone else would want to endorse as virtuous.
C.

Confronting the Hardest Cases

Virtue ethicists and capabilities theorists generally reject a
purely hedonic account of welfare by citing hypotheticals that
ostensibly reveal the weaknesses of that account. In this section, we
will confront directly the most difficult ones.
Here are three such examples. In each case, the question is
whether A or B has more welfare.
Example 1
A‟s spouse is cheating on her, but she is unaware of it and is
happy in her marriage. She would be miserable if she knew
the truth, but she never learns of it and is never affected by it at
all.
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B‟s spouse is faithful, and B assesses her marriage accurately.
But she is less happy than is A.70
Example 2
A lives in poverty in a society that discriminates against her
based on her sex. But she has adapted to the poverty and
discrimination and feels quite happy.71
B lives a life of comfort, activity, and commitment to justice,
all in a society that gives her full political and social rights and
nourishes her capabilities. But she feels less happy than does A
throughout her life.
Example 3
A feels happy, but only because she has chosen to hook herself
up to an experience machine. She is having (unbeknownst to
her conscious mind) no actual experiences in the real world.
B feels less happy but is living an ordinary life in the world,
hooked up to no machine.
In all three examples, we hold that A has more welfare than does B.
Consider Example 1. Anyone who deems B to be better off
than A must explain how a person‟s well-being can be affected by
things wholly outside of her veil of experience. As we have argued, a
person‟s life is her sensory experience of the world. Anything that has
no effect on that experience does not influence her life and therefore
does not influence her well-being. As we will discuss in Part III, an
animal-lover is not made better off by the survival of a squirrel in a
far-off land if the animal-lover never learns of that survival and is
never affected by it. Similarly, someone is not made better or worse
off by events that occur after her death, no matter how she would have
felt about those events had she known about them while she was alive.
Well-being concerns one‟s experience of life, and something must
affect that experience in order to affect well-being.
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See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A Posner, Happiness Research and CostBenefit Analysis, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 6); see also
ADLER & POSNER, supra note 10, at 30 (providing a related example).
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See Nussbaum, supra note 69 (manuscript at 20-21).
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If one‟s initial intuition is that B might be better off than A,
what accounts for that? We suspect that the intuition comes from
considerations ruled out by the hypothetical: e.g., people who know
the truth (including A‟s cheating spouse) would treat A differently as a
result of knowing, and A would be affected negatively by that different
treatment. These hypotheticals can create problems for our intuitions
because they ask us to accept analytically clean frameworks that are at
odds with real experience—for example, that A will never learn the
truth and will not be indirectly affected by it in ways that make her
less happy than B. Such assurances do not exist in real life, but we
believe that if the example‟s rules are taken seriously, then it makes
more sense to say that A is better off.
Example 1 thus pits happiness against the truth. The truth may
have some sort of objective moral value, but if it has value that counts
as part of welfare, then what would that value be? We believe it
would be the sort of thing ruled out by the hypothetical: When your
happiness depends on a lie of which you are unaware, then that
happiness is more vulnerable to being undermined than if it were
based on the truth. You might learn the truth, or else the truth might
interfere negatively with your life in a less direct way. So we have a
valid intuitive attachment to the truth, even as regards welfare—but
that attachment makes sense only insofar as truth-based happiness is,
all else equal, more reliable in the end for maximizing one‟s overall
happiness than is falsehood-based happiness. Example 1, however,
requires us to take all considerations like these out of the equation and
to assume that A will not be harmed (in terms of a reduction in her
subjective well-being)72 by her unawareness. If we force ourselves to
believe that assumption, then the view that happiness is the sole
component of welfare retains its intuitive appeal.
Example 2 involves related concerns. If we try to imagine
ourselves as A or B, it seems that we would be much happier as B. But
of course the point of the example is to stipulate that A is happier, so
as to test the contention that happiness constitutes welfare. Why might
A be happier? Maybe A belongs to a tight-knit social group of friends,
extended family, or fellow religious worshippers, whereas B has fewer
if any close social ties. If we start to flesh out the reasons that A might
be happier than B (i.e., might feel better and have more subjective
well-being) then our sense that B‟s life seems better starts to erode.
72
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The more we come to believe that A is actually happier, the clearer it
becomes that A has a better life.
Of course, a critic could argue that this sort of fleshing out
involves attributing to A but not to B aspects of life that are valuable in
non-hedonic terms—that we care about social ties not because they
make us feel good but because they are part of (for example) human
flourishing, or so the argument would go. It is hard to sort out answers
to such challenges because there is overlap between that which is
valued by other theories (e.g., virtue ethics or the capabilities
approach) and that which makes us feel good, and it can be difficult to
know which one is driving our positive assessment of the thing in
question.
To address this difficulty, let us take another cut at the issue by
considering whether one given individual, C, would have more
welfare if she lived in an oppressive society but felt happier or if she
lived in a free and just society but felt less happy. In the oppressive
society, she could not go to school beyond age twelve or play a role in
the workforce. In the free society, school is not only permitted but
required through age eighteen, and every opportunity is available.
Assume that C doesn‟t enjoy school; it involves a lot of work and
pressure, and she is not excited by or interested in the knowledge
being bestowed or in the process of acquiring it. Assume also that C
doesn‟t enjoy working, even when doing things that are thoughtprovoking and socially valuable. Work feels like a grind, with
pressure and deadlines. Although in the free society C was able to
choose a different career and might (or might not) have been able to
find one that would have given her greater enjoyment, the countless
available options kept her from being funneled (as she is in the
oppressive society) into a life of laziness and low stress that she likes
much better. Add in the fact that in the oppressive society, C never
even realizes she is being oppressed because, among other things, she
likes all the things she ends up doing.
We assume that the free society is normatively preferable, all
things considered, but that is not the question. The question is whether
C has more welfare in the oppressive society (where she lives a
contented, lazy life) or in the free society (where she lives a stressful,
active life). The answer is that she has more welfare in the oppressive
society. The sedentary life there is better for her than is the active
alternative. Welfare is a concept concerned exclusively with her wellbeing. To insist that her life in the free society has greater welfare

Welfare as Happiness

22

would be to fail to give full credit to her individuality. What makes
her happy is to be relatively inactive, and that fact is credited fully by
a conception of welfare that cares only about what makes her happy.
In this conception that we defend, there is nothing wrong with
being inactive, at least as far as one‟s own welfare is concerned, so
long as being inactive makes one happy. Those who take a different
view impose some sort of objective code upon individuals who do not
approach life the same way. More to the point, such an objectivist
view would claim that the welfare of these individuals is better served
by what the view‟s proponents value than by what the individuals
value or enjoy. According to the objectivist view, not only don‟t the
individuals know what‟s good for them, but their view of what‟s good
for themselves doesn‟t determine what‟s good for them—no matter
how considered or accurate (in terms of happiness) a view it is.
Example 2, which on its face seems so thorny for our mental-state
theory, thus lays bare the decisive weakness of the alternative
conception of welfare.73
This brings us finally to Example 3, the experience machine.
Could someone sitting motionless with her head attached to electrodes
really have greater welfare than someone whose experiences are real?
The answer is yes, even though there are all sorts of reasons for people
not to want to attach themselves to the machine. For example, they
73

It should go without saying that we are not defending repressive societies.
When Nussbaum raises a point that relates to Example 2, her argument runs as
follows:
[P]eople who were not brought up to think of themselves as equal
citizens with a full range of citizens‟ rights will not report
dissatisfaction at the absence of equality—until a protest movement
galvanizes awareness. . . . So deferring to the subjective experience of
pleasure or satisfaction will often bias the social inquiry in the direction
of an unjust status quo.
Nussbaum, supra note 69 (manuscript at 20-21). This sort of argument is
compatible with our approach. We do not argue for crafting social policy that is
based solely on maximization of subjective well-being. Moreover, even a happiness
maximizer might well take the view that in the long run, happiness is served by the
sort of political system that Nussbaum advocates. This sort of view applies as well
to Example 1, in which A‟s happiness is precarious and constantly endangered by the
threat of learning the truth or of being affected negatively by the actions of others
who know the truth. And apart from those concerns, there are welfare-independent
arguments to be made in favor of policies that promote lives like B rather than A in
all three examples.
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might not want to forego the opportunity to use their lives to improve
the lives of others; or they might not be convinced the machine will
actually work; or they might fear that while on the machine, they will
be vulnerable to harm from those in the real world. When we ask
whether someone attached to the machine has greater welfare, we
must look behind whatever visceral aversion to the machine we might
have and assess (i) whether that aversion relates to welfare and (ii)
whether the aversion springs from rejecting the rules of the
hypothetical example.
We experience the world through our senses, and in that
respect the machine life is no less real than is ordinary life. When we
picture the machine life, we get a mental image of what we look like
to someone who is not on the machine (i.e., we look like someone
sitting alone, plugged into electrodes). But life within the world
created by the machine would look like ordinary life, complete with
social ties, soaring natural beauty, and whatever else the individual
derives happiness from. To the extent that negative feelings are
necessary to maximize overall happiness,74 those negative feelings
would be present too. Absent would be any pain or suffering (much
less early death) that is not necessary for overall happiness.75 In other
words, a life on the machine is a life that would be self-evidently
wonderful for the person living it if she were living it in the real world.
The question is whether it matters that she is living it on the machine.
Our answer is that it matters, but not in terms of her welfare.
Once she is attached to the machine, her welfare is unaffected by the
fact of being attached to it. By hypothesis, she has no awareness that
her machine-life is anything other than real. Compare two parallel
lives, one in which a person eschews the machine and one in which
she attaches herself to it, say at age 20. In the machine life she is
enormously happy until she dies at age 100. What if she were to die
tragically in the alternative real life at 21? Would the real life have
been one in which she had greater welfare, one that was better for her,
than the machine-life? Absolutely not. And the answer does not
change if in the real life she lived until 25, or 45, or 100 and was
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For example, it might be the case that positive feelings are more intense if a
person has some negative feelings to contrast them with.
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Cf. id. (manuscript at 29) (“Public policy should also focus on the mitigation
of the sort of pain that is not an enrichment of the soul or a deepening of selfknowledge, and there is a lot of pain that is not conducive to anything good.”).
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relatively unhappy. Feeling bad or being unhappy is worse for a
person than is feeling good or being happy.
D.
Responding to Nussbaum’s Recent Discussion of the
Hedonic Conception of Welfare
Martha Nussbaum recently published a sustained critique of
the hedonic conception of welfare, in the context of a symposium
about the new findings of hedonic psychology. [CITE] We address
her arguments in the sections that follow..
1.

Measuring Pleasure and Life Satisfaction

If we are right that welfare is of value and that subjective wellbeing constitutes welfare, then it is important to refine our tools for
measuring subjective well-being. Nussbaum contributes to this project
by noting several concerns: that the concept of “pleasure”
encompasses multiple feelings or sensations that differ qualitatively
from one another,76 that aggregating experiences into one unitary
measure of life satisfaction may be difficult or impossible,77 and that
there may be a problematic ambiguity in the question about life
satisfaction.78
We regard the first issue, the nature of pleasure, to represent
primarily a physiological question. Could it not someday be answered
by comparing the neurological processes that occur when someone
eats a steak to those that occur when she listens to Mahler? Research
supports the view that different sorts of good feelings share a common
thread that makes us like having those feelings and that distinguishes
them from negative feelings.79
Even if it were true that pleasure is a hopelessly messy and
complicated phenomenon, comprising innumerable different shades of
feeling and including even certain sorts of painful emotions, that
would not invalidate the project of measuring subjective well-being
and trying to promote it. There will always be more to learn about
happiness for scholars of biology, social science, and philosophy, and
76

Id. (manuscript at 2-6).
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the added knowledge will be most helpful in tailoring policies that
promote happiness. It does not follow, though, that happinesspromoting policies cannot usefully be pursued until every possible
wrinkle has been sorted out—any more than it would make sense to
delay the establishment of governments before we had a full
understanding of what the best system would entail.80
Similarly, the potential difficulties in aggregation are cause for
care and attention but are hardly fatal to our project. According to
Nussbaum, survey questions that ask people to rate their life
satisfaction “bully” subjects into aggregating their experiences
unnaturally: “There is no opportunity for them to answer something
plausible, such as „Well, my health is good, and my work is going
well, but I am very upset about the Iraq war, and one of my friends is
very ill.‟”81 We agree that many different sorts of considerations can
comprise how one feels about one‟s life. And assigning a number to
one‟s life satisfaction is a blunt instrument that obscures this
complexity.
That said, much of life revolves around these sorts of
simplifications to the impossibly complex nature of reality,
simplifications that are nevertheless of enormous practical value.
Virtually every decision we make involves some sort of rough-andready calculation that ignores many relevant considerations. Even
Nussbaum‟s own example of a “plausible” answer abounds with
aggregations that simplify and distort reality. The statement, “My
work is going well,” glosses over the virtually infinite factors that
could influence one‟s assessment of that large part of life, and yet (as
Nussbaum affirms) it is a plausible statement because people engage
in such aggregating glosses all of the time. A negative interaction
with a co-worker, for example, is understandably swept under the rug
by that statement because the interaction is deemed insufficiently
important to change the overall assessment.
We cannot rule out the possibility that people feel bullied to
aggregate incommensurables when they are asked the question about
their life satisfaction. But could it not instead be the case that denying
the possibility of such aggregating, even in the face of people‟s ability
and willingness to do it (and familiarity with doing it in all aspects of
80
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life), is a sort of bullying in its own right? Nussbaum might view this
sort of aggregating as absurd and nonsensical, but that is not
necessarily a view shared by those who answer the survey questions.
Their choice to give an answer82 is admittedly not decisive evidence
that they view the question as legitimate, but it is at least a piece of
evidence in favor of that conclusion, as contrasted with a complete
absence of evidence to the contrary.83
2.

Bad Pleasures

Nussbaum notes that “pleasure is simply not normatively
reliable.”84 For example, “Rich people have pleasure in being ever
richer, and lording it over others, but this hardly shows that
redistributive taxation is incorrect. Racists have pleasure in their
racism, sexists in their sexism.”85 She goes on to point out that certain
economists have constrained their welfarism by excluding from the
welfare calculus these sorts of pleasures.86
We agree, of course, that redistributive taxation is not shown to
be incorrect by the point that rich people take pleasure in being ever
richer. It is necessary, however, to keep separate these two questions:
(a) whether redistributive taxation improves the life of an individual
rich person, and (b) whether such taxation is a good policy for society
as a whole. The answer to (b) could be yes even if the answer to (a)
were no. One reason for this possible divergence is that redistributive
taxation may well increase the pleasure of the poor; indeed, due to
decreasing marginal utility and other considerations, such taxation
82
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may well benefit the poor more than it harms the rich. Another reason
is that there could be moral considerations independent of welfare that
support such taxation. Moreover, even the answer to (a) could be yes:
the rich might not, on the whole, actually benefit from the absence of
redistribution.
But if indeed a rich person were made happier on the whole by
the absence of redistributive taxation, then that rich person‟s welfare
would be increased by such an absence. It is likely that this sort of
increase in welfare would be outweighed (from the perspective of
policymaking) by other considerations, including the effect on the
welfare of others. But it would be inaccurate to characterize the
negative effects of low taxation as eliminating the welfare
enhancement that such a policy bestows on the rich person. If that
person is made happier by the policy, then she is made better off by it.
Her well-being is conceptually distinct from the well-being of others
(if only because others‟ well-being, by hypothesis, has no effect on her
happiness in this example) or from moral considerations that are
independent of welfare.
The same analysis applies to racists, sexists, and homophobes.
Nussbaum writes that “[t]o some people, the distress caused by the
presence of a homosexual couple next door is just as acute as the
distress caused by the presence of a running sewer next door.”87 We
cannot stress strongly enough that we oppose policies catering to these
sorts of discriminatory preferences. As a starting point, we are not
even certain that those who harbor those preferences really are made
happier by the bitterness and intolerance embodied therein. But even
if those people were made happier, we are convinced that their
happiness is outweighed by the reduction in happiness that
discriminatory policies impose on others. And even if that were not
true, moral arguments unrelated to welfare could still be made against
such policies. As with the point about taxation, the best policy for
society may well be one that reduces the welfare of some individuals
within it. Notwithstanding all of these caveats, though, it remains true
that if a homophobe really were made happier on the whole by a
policy banning a homosexual couple from living next door, then that
homophobe‟s welfare would be increased by such a policy. At least as
a matter of analytical truth, racism can increase a racist‟s welfare. The
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project of opposing discrimination
mischaracterizing welfare.88
3.

does

not

depend

on

Good Pains

Nussbaum also emphasizes that “some valuable activities are
not accompanied by pleasure”89 and that the absence of negative
emotion can lead people to be insensitive and even aggressive toward
others.90 These claims are compatible with ours. An activity like
“fac[ing] death in battle for the sake of a noble end”91 might be
valuable notwithstanding its failure to increase the welfare of the
actor. Its value could come from increasing others‟ welfare or perhaps
from some other source. And if it is true that a shortage of negative
emotion can make people insensitive or aggressive, then that could
count in favor of a degree of negative emotion. Insensitivity or
aggressiveness almost certainly will decrease others‟ welfare (we
suspect they will also result in decreased welfare for the actor herself,
directly or indirectly) and may be morally problematic for independent
reasons as well.92
Our argument is not that we should root out all unpleasant
emotion, regardless of the consequences. It is simply that unpleasant
emotion, all else being equal, constitutes a decrease in happiness (and
therefore in welfare) for the person experiencing the emotion. Such
unpleasantness might be necessary to achieve all sorts of ends,
including even the maximization of long-term happiness for the
individual in question. But when we bracket those considerations and
stipulate that the emotion really does make the person feel worse
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We note that this may not be a point of disagreement with Nussbaum. She
argues, as do we, that honoring discriminatory preferences is undesirable. And she
notes that Mill and Harsanyi do not count such preferences as welfare. Id.
(manuscript at 17). But she herself does not commit to the view that welfare
excludes those preferences.
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Id. (manuscript at 17-18).
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Id. (manuscript at 17-20).
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Id. (manuscript at 18).
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overall, we are left with the fact that the unpleasantness is bad for the
person who experiences it.93
4.

The Relationship Between Welfare and Living a
Good Life

Just as risking death for a noble end might be valuable even
though it decreases the welfare of the one who does it, choosing a
risky or difficult career path might be valuable. Nussbaum applauds
those who make such sacrifices,94 and so do we. But a difference
between our view and hers emerges if Nussbaum is taken to
characterize such sacrifice as necessarily welfare-enhancing for the
risk-taker: “Public policy should make room for, and honor,
commitments that are in their very nature fraught with risk, pain, and
difficulty, especially commitments to fighting for social justice, as not
optional but mandatory parts . . . of the good life of any human
being.”95
Our take on this statement is probably clear from what has
gone before. In no way do we deny the value of altruism: it typically
increases others‟ welfare and may also have welfare-unrelated moral
worth. Moreover, we think that other-regarding behavior often
increases the happiness of the person who engages in it.96 But
altruistic behavior does not increase the welfare of the altruist unless it
makes the altruist happier (whether it be directly or indirectly, in the
short term or the long term). We take no position on what constitutes
a “good life” in some objective sense, but if altruistic acts make a
given person feel worse overall, then those acts detract from her
welfare. Others may gain, but she loses. In terms of individual wellbeing, accepting pain and difficulty in the service of justice is not a
mandatory part of the good life of every human being.
93

Although much is often made of the benefits associated with painful or
unpleasant experiences, empirical studies consistently show that experiencing
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Like altruism, other acts valued by Nussbaum are unrelated to
welfare unless they increase happiness. Nussbaum cites widespread
agreement that
a life with feeling alone and no action is impoverished. . . .
[A] person who sits around doing nothing, or even just
counting blades of grass, or a person plugged into Robert
Nozick‟s “experience machine” that generates pleasant
experiences, is not living a life of the sort we should try to
promote, however pleased that person feels.97
Assume for the sake of argument that two people both genuinely enjoy
lazing around and are made genuinely displeased by being active. One
of them, A, chooses to spend her life lazing; whereas the other, B,
chooses to spend it in active pursuits that Nussbaum finds admirable.
A has a happier life—a life of greater welfare—than B. If Nussbaum
would deny this, then her conception of welfare is insufficiently
attentive to the differences among individuals.98
5.

Feeling or Judgment?

A virtue ethicist, for example, might argue that although
virtuous activity need not create pleasurable feeling, it will be judged
as valuable by the person who engages in it. Nussbaum emphasizes
this distinction between feeling and judgment in the context of
critiquing the psychological surveys used to measure subjective wellbeing.99 It is worth taking a moment to address the possibility that
subjective judgment of the value of an activity or of one‟s life
constitutes happiness.
In large measure, we consider such a possibility to be
consistent with our mental-state approach. If a skier deems her skiing
to be a valuable activity, that judgment is itself an internal positive
feeling. Making judgments about the value of one‟s life is a cognitive
act imbued with an emotional state in the same way that meditation,
97

Nussbaum, supra note 69 (manuscript at 21).
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philosophizing, and remembering are. When people judge their own
acts to be good, they are made happy by that judgment—according to
our definition of happiness. It makes a person feel good when she
decides that she is doing the right thing or living the right way.
Our only caveat is that such judgment is only one type of good
feeling and therefore only one way in which to be happy. Imagine a
person who works during the day to stop violations of civil rights, then
spends the night playing video games. If he judges only the work to
be valuable but enjoys the games notwithstanding his intellectual
judgment that they are devoid of value, then he derives happiness both
from the positive judgment of the work and from the enjoyment of the
games.
*

*

*

The qualities and behaviors valued by virtue ethicists and
capabilities theorists—e.g., courage, reflection, temperance,
commitment to justice, and willingness to sacrifice for others—are
widely regarded as positive attributes. But why do we view them as
positive? The reason might be moral and deontological: wholly
separate from considerations of welfare. The reason might also
involve the fact that when one person exhibits those qualities, she
often increases the welfare of others. Finally, the reason might include
the idea that those qualities can make the person who possesses them
happier.
All of those reasons may be important, but only the last one
relates to the welfare of the individual possessing the traits. To the
extent that objectivist theories offer accounts of well-being, they
conflate an individual‟s well-being with other values. Our mentalstate account, by contrast, focuses on what well-being really is—
positive sensory experience of the world. If an individual benefits
from being courageous, she benefits in that her courage makes her feel
better than she would have felt otherwise. Subjective well-being
captures our understanding of the concept of welfare far better than
does an objective account.
III. SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING AS LAUNDERED PREFERENCES
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Most scholars who would not define welfare as an active life
of human flourishing would instead define it as an individual‟s success
in satisfying her preferences. This preference-based theory of welfare
has long held sway among economists and recently received its most
robust theoretical defense from Matthew Adler and Eric Posner. In
this Part we analyze the arguments typically made by adherents of the
preference-based theory against hedonic conceptions of well-being
and illustrate that the former are unavailing. We then demonstrate that
Adler and Posner‟s refined conception of preferences ultimately
collapses into our subjective theory of well-being. Indeed, the two are
one and the same.
A.

A Preference-Based Theory of Welfare

The leading theory of welfare, to which economists of various
stripes have long subscribed, locates welfare within an individual‟s set
of preferences. Imagine a person P who has a choice between
outcomes (or “states”) O1 and O2. An individual has greater welfare in
state O2 than in state O1 if and only if she actually prefers O2 to O1.
Put another way, an individual‟s welfare increases as she is able to
satisfy her preferences to move from state On to state On+1; as the
individual is able to satisfy more and more of her preferences and
move to even more desirable states of being, her welfare increases
accordingly.
1.

Orthodox Welfarism

In classical economic terms, the fact that an individual prefers
O2 to O1 is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the individual
to have greater welfare in state O2.100 On the standard economic
model, preferences are the alpha and omega of welfare. However, this
straightforward view of preferences-as-welfare has received trenchant
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criticism from philosophers and some economists,101 who make two
principal objections. First, cognitive errors or a lack of information
can lead someone to choose O2 over O1 even though, if she
experienced each state, she would actually prefer O1.102 And second,
individuals can hold preferences that are entirely remote from their
own interactions with the world—preferences that, if satisfied, will not
benefit the preference holder in any way because she will not even
know they have been satisfied.103
We take it to be clear that the first objection shows the
superiority of the mental-state approach over orthodox welfarism.
Suppose that Sally‟s parents surprise her by bringing home ice cream
and that Sally hopes the flavor will be chocolate. Chocolate is her
preference because she has forgotten that she actually enjoys the taste
of vanilla more. Is she better off in O1, where her parents bring vanilla
and she enjoys it more, or in O2, where they bring chocolate and she
enjoys it less? We think it evident that she is better off in O1.104
It would be possible to craft a preference-based view that
conceded this point while still denying the validity of the second
objection. On such a view, welfare would be defined by the
satisfaction of preferences that either increased subjective well-being
or had no effect on subjective well-being. But for the reasons that we
articulate throughout this Article, the pure mental-state approach better
captures what is commonly meant by well-being than does that hybrid
preference approach. If Sally were asked whether she would prefer O1
(a state of things in which there would be peace on earth in the year
2200) or O2 (in which there would be war in 2200), she might well
choose O1, all else being equal. If Sally dies in 2015, does it increase
her welfare if in fact there is peace in 2200? We think that it does
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not.105 The same could be said for states of the world that accord with
Sally‟s preferences while she is alive but that she is unaware of.106
We will give no more attention to the orthodox approach
because it has no means, in our view, to defend itself against such
objections. We turn our attention for the rest of this Part, therefore, to
a more sophisticated version of preference-based welfarism.
2.

Adler and Posner‟s Refined Preference-Based
Welfarism

To overcome the two foregoing objections to orthodox
welfarism, Matthew Adler and Eric Posner have designed a more
refined preference-based account of welfare. In response to the first
objection, they classify “evil, ignorant, adaptive, or otherwise
misshapen” preferences (which may be based upon imperfect
information, cognitive biases, or simply sadistic tendencies) as
nonideal, and they propose to launder them—to remove them from the
welfare calculus or correct the inaccurate information upon which they
are based.107
Adler and Posner‟s treatment of the second objection—the
possibility of “remote” preferences that do not impact the preferenceholder—is somewhat more involved. They provide a number of
illustrative examples, one of which concerns the endangered Sri
Lankan squirrel and an environmentally conscious American named
Sheila.108 Imagine that the squirrel is teetering on the brink of
extinction. Sheila may well prefer the state of the world in which the
squirrel does not become extinct; in the abstract, what environmentally
conscious person would not? But if she never visits Sri Lanka, never
studies the squirrel, never sees it in captivity, and—this point is
crucial—never learns that the squirrel has survived, it is difficult to see
how the squirrel‟s continued existence increases her own welfare.
Adler and Posner would launder these preferences from the welfare
calculus as insufficiently self-interested, in that they do not appear to
benefit the preference holder directly.109 The result is a set of
105
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necessary conditions for increases in human welfare: the individual
must prefer state O2 to state O1; her preference must be idealized, in
the sense of being based upon full information, not subject to cognitive
biases, and not “evil”; and the preference must be self-interested, such
that its fulfillment will actually benefit the holder directly.
We agree that conventional preference-based accounts of
welfare are flawed, and we believe that Adler and Posner‟s theoretical
modifications—the laundering of non-ideal or non-self-interested
preferences—are indeed necessary if the preference-based account is
to gain any purchase. But we believe that Adler and Posner‟s
preference-based account of welfare proves both more and less than
they claim. The best available theory instead defines human welfare
as subjective well-being.
B.

The Preference-Based Case Against Subjective WellBeing

Adler and Posner‟s case against a subjective well-being
account of welfare is primarily a negative one. They acknowledge that
subjective well-being forms a significant part, and perhaps even the
predominant share, of individual welfare.110 After all, individuals
undoubtedly gauge their welfare to a substantial degree by their own
happiness, and presumably a large proportion of the preferences that
people seek to satisfy are designed to increase happiness and
subjective satisfaction.111 Nevertheless, Adler and Posner argue that
there must be more to welfare than happiness. They offer a number of
arguments based upon classic philosophical thought experiments,
many of which take the following form: Adler and Posner posit two
people with subjectively equivalent mental states and argue that one of
those two people must have greater welfare than the other based upon
some objective consideration external to the person‟s state of mind.
(Their most prominent example is Nozick‟s “experience machine.”112)
Accordingly, they conclude, welfare must have components beyond
110
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purely subjective happiness. It is through this opening that Adler and
Posner drive their preference-based theory.
Because these arguments against subjective well-being are
drawn primarily from objectivist accounts of welfare, we have already
considered and rejected most of them in the previous section.113
Nonetheless, a few of Adler and Posner‟s arguments warrant extended
discussion here. The first is the case of the Deceived Scholar.
Adler and Posner imagine a person who wishes to achieve a
reputation as a great scholar and to be treated as one by friends and
colleagues. In state O2 that person is indeed a scholar of great rank
and esteem; in state O1 that person is the subject of a massive trick, an
academic Truman Show, in which his colleagues and friends lead him
to believe that he is a great scholar while secretly harboring the
knowledge that his scholarship is second-rate.114 The scholar‟s
subjective mental states are equivalent in O1 and O2, and yet surely,
Adler and Posner argue, his welfare must be greater in O2, where his
colleagues‟ feelings are genuine.
This is the virtue ethicist‟s “Example 1” (the cuckolded
husband) in variant form. Again, the example has undeniable intuitive
force, but it has such force primarily because of our tendency to
disbelieve its hypothetical terms. We cannot bring ourselves to accept
that the scholar‟s subjective experience is actually the same in O1 as it
is in O2. He must occasionally catch his colleagues snickering behind
his back and wonder what has caused them to laugh; his papers must
be rejected by leading journals or top conferences more than someone
in his position would expect, forcing him to confront his own creeping
self-doubt; or at minimum his interactions with his “adoring”
colleagues must somehow lack the authenticity of true warmth, as
opposed to concocted platitudes. Our intuition simply recoils at the
notion that the Deceived Scholar could be so perfectly deceived.
But what if he is? What if, in his own mind, he is living the
life of a truly esteemed scholar in all of its particulars? Moreover,
what if an outside observer, privy only to the Deceived Scholar‟s
interactions with the world (and not the private information held by his
contemptuous colleagues), were unable to distinguish his life from the
life of a genuine luminary? The Deceived Scholar might be lacking in
other respects, but how could it be said that his welfare is any lower
than that of the true academic star? After all, by hypothesis their lives
113
114
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are indistinguishable; he is equally well off in every imaginable
respect in both situations. No welfare-based grounds exist for
choosing between the two.
Let us put this in Adler and Posner‟s own terms. The scholar is
no different from Sheila, the environmentalist concerned about the Sri
Lankan squirrel. Sheila would prefer that the squirrel continue to
exist, just as any scholar, given the choice, would prefer a legitimately
first-rate reputation. Adler and Posner hold that Sheila‟s welfare
would be unaffected if the squirrel were to become extinct without it
ever coming to Sheila‟s attention or affecting her life, because her
preference is not self-interested. The squirrel‟s existence or lack
thereof is simply an objective fact in the world that does not interact
with Sheila and therefore cannot affect her well-being, on Adler and
Posner‟s own view. So too for the scholar: if his cognitive and
emotional lives in states O1 and O2 are identical, then his preference
for O2 cannot be self-interested. Given the parameters of the example,
his reputation is simply an objective fact in the world that impacts his
life not a whit. The examples of Sheila and the scholar show that
people can have preferences for things that do not affect their lives and
thus do not affect their welfare. Such preferences could be the result
of an interest in others‟ welfare, or welfare-unrelated moral
considerations, or a mistaken belief that the preferred thing will
increase the person‟s own welfare. Either way, the example of Sheila
is identical to that of the deceived scholar. Adler and Posner‟s own
position refutes their argument against subjective well-being.
Adler and Posner‟s other examples are no more availing. They
write that an individual “may prefer not to be exposed to a toxin” even
if that person perceives no risk from the toxin.115 But of course the
preference for avoiding this risk stems from the fact that the individual
might eventually suffer substantial harm—harm that carries a hedonic
penalty—from this exposure. If the “toxin” in fact involved zero risk,
and the individual were unaware of her exposure to it, then the
individual would be no better off for having avoided it. Similarly,
they note that “an individual might strongly prefer not to become
physically disabled, even though she recognizes that those who
become physically disabled tend to adapt and return to their predisability level of happiness.”116 As a factual matter, this claim is
incorrect—people who become disabled typically recover only half (or
115
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less) of their lost subjective well-being.117 Even if it were true, these
individuals would still suffer lost well-being during the period of
adaptation (which lasts for two years or more).118 Any self-interested
individual would rationally wish to avoid disability. And if disability
actually had no negative effect on a person‟s subjective well-being,
then the preference to avoid it would be based on mistaken
assumptions and thus subject to the laundering that Adler and Posner
themselves impose.
Finally, Adler and Posner note that “an individual‟s happiness
is substantially, if not exclusively, a matter of her basic disposition—
that many of the things individuals care about and strive for don‟t
affect mental well-being very much.”119 This is, of course, one of the
most significant and counter-intuitive findings of hedonic psychology
(though the “if not exclusively” suggestion is overstated).120 Yet it is
not clear why it should constitute an argument against a hedonic
conception of welfare. Adler and Posner recognize that individuals
frequently concern themselves with outcomes that do not affect them
personally—e.g., Sheila and the Sri Lankan squirrel.121 They do not,
however, treat the existence of these disinterested preferences as an
argument against a preference-based account of welfare. Rather, they
simply launder them from the calculus. Moreover, there is every
indication that when individuals “care about and strive for” things,
they often mistakenly believe that these things will make them happy.
The prevalence of such failures of affective forecasting is another of
the most striking and important findings of hedonic psychology.122
Were individuals able to predict their own future mental states
accurately, their preferences might change quite dramatically. We
return to this point in detail in the section that follows.
In sum, Adler and Posner‟s objections to a subjective account
of welfare cannot bear the weight placed upon them. Having
117
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acknowledged that subjective well-being comprises a substantial
portion of individual welfare, they assert that welfare must entail more
than mere hedonic mental states. But their examples and arguments
do not support to that assertion.
C.

The Hedonic Foundation of Laundered Preferences

As we explained in the preceding section, Adler and Posner‟s
arguments against a subjective account of welfare are based upon the
claim that there must be elements of welfare that subjective mental
states do not reflect or cannot account for. We demonstrated the
fallacy of that claim and illustrated that Adler and Posner‟s own
approach (laundered preferences) is inconsistent with their arguments
against subjective well-being.
That inconsistency is indicative of a deeper connection
between their theory and ours: Adler and Posner‟s preference-based
theory of welfare reduces to a purely subjective hedonic account. 123 In
other words, the two are isomorphic—identical. According to Adler
and Posner‟s own theoretical ground rules, the “thing” for which an
individual possesses welfare-relevant preferences is her own
subjective well-being.
1.

Preference Laundering and End Objectives

One of the most interesting and important features of Adler and
Posner‟s argument for a preference-based account of welfare is its
emphasis on laundering individual preferences. Preferences can be
easily distorted by a lack of information; for example, an individual
might prefer one outcome to another without understanding the full
ramifications of that preference or without being able to predict
accurately what impact the satisfaction of that preference will have
upon her life.124 As a theoretical matter, Adler and Posner suggest that
123
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these preferences, along with “disinterested” preferences (Sheila and
the Sri Lankan squirrel),125 should be recalibrated to reflect what their
holders would in fact prefer in the presence of full information.126
Their innovative theory is based upon the imagined counter-factual of
a rational, self-interested citizenry acting in the presence of complete
information.127
This laundering of preferences reveals that Adler and Posner‟s
conception of welfare is one of ends, not means. Theirs is not an
approach in which the individual‟s capacity to satisfy her preferences
is the measure of that individual‟s welfare. Nor is it a theory of
“decision utility,” in which an individual‟s decision itself (the satisfied
preference) is treated as the unassailable measure of welfare.128
Rather, the individual is understood to have a set of self-interested
objectives, and the satisfaction of preferences is the manner by which
she advances toward those objectives—from O1 to O2 to O3, and so
forth.129 Preferences that do not allow an individual to make progress
toward fulfilling her objectives are not truly welfare-enhancing on
Adler and Posner‟s view.
In light of this approach, the preference-based account of
welfare demands a laundering not only of uninformed preferences but
also of any preference influenced by any sub-rational judgment or any
systematic failure of forecasting. Consider, for example, a nervous
consumer who fears a 1 in 100 million chance of dying from
salmonella-infected spinach and chooses to purchase iceberg lettuce
instead. If that consumer has simply improperly gauged the import of
“noise and commotion from construction of the dam” will interfere with her
enjoyment of her vacation home. Id. at 124.
125
In addition, they suggest laundering “objectively bad” preferences, such as
sadistic inclinations or preferences for social disorder. Id. at 124-25. This decision
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a 1 in 100 million risk130—failing to realize, for example, that it is
orders of magnitude smaller than the risk to life from driving to the
supermarket to purchase the lettuce—or overrated the risk due to
salience bias, then his preference should be laundered to reflect his
true feelings were he capable of correctly assessing the relevant
risks.131 Or imagine a worker who chooses to move from a small
downtown condominium to a larger house in the suburbs, believing
that he will not mind the additional commute. If he is incorrect, and if
the time spent in his car will in fact bring him great unhappiness, then
his preferences should be similarly laundered to reflect his true choices
absent this forecasting error. Optimism biases,132 hindsight biases,133
salience
biases,134
status
quo
biases,135
low-probability
136
137
miscalculations, framing and anchoring effects, and other sorts of
cognitive errors—along with affective forecasting errors, focusing
illusions, and other types of hedonic misapprehensions138—must all be
laundered to produce an individual‟s idealized set of preferences.
2.

130

Preferences for What?

Jonathan S. Masur, Probability Thresholds, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1293, 1233
(2007) (describing the tendency to overestimate the importance of low-probability
events).
131
See ADLER & POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS, supra note 10, at 147
(“[C]ognitive biases drive a wedge between preference satisfaction and wellbeing.”).
132
See generally Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life
Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806 (1980).
133
See generally Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of
Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288 (1975).
134
See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1127 (1974).
135
See generally William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in
Decision Making, 1 J. RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988); see also Richard Thaler,
Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39
(1980) (discussing “endowment effects” more specifically).
136
Masur, supra note 156, at 1331-37.
137
See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the
Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251 (1986); Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment
Under Uncertainty, supra note 160, at 1128.
138
See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
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The result of this extensive laundering process is a rational,139
self-interested, idealized individual—one who has in mind a set of
personal objectives and formulates preferences accurately designed to
achieve those objectives. But on this account, what sorts of objectives
might such a person possess? We believe that under Adler and
Posner‟s analytical framework, there is only one option.
Consider the case of the Driven Scholar—a colleague of our
Deceived Scholar. Ten years into his career at a major university, the
Driven Scholar is faced with a choice: he can sustain himself as a
reasonably productive researcher, spend significant leisure time with
his wife—a busy professional herself—and their two young children,
and generally lead a satisfying and happy life (Path A); or he can
devote himself body-and-soul to his work, slowly lose contact with his
devoted family, but achieve great scientific breakthroughs, an eventual
Nobel Prize, and widespread acclaim (Path B). Suppose, however,
that the Scholar—endowed with full information and stripped of
affective forecasting errors—understands that Path B will not bring
him happiness. Thirty years later, blessed with a Nobel Prize but
estranged from his family, he will take less pleasure in life, and view
his life as ultimately less satisfying, than he would have if he had
accepted a more modest career in exchange for the lasting company of
his family. Fame and recognition have fleeting hedonic consequences;
marriage and social ties are far more important to an individual‟s
subjective well-being.140
About this hypothetical we can say two things. First, few
people—maybe no one—would prefer Path B as a means of
maximizing their own well-being.141 The contrary view is certainly
tempting; the reader may feel herself immediately drawn to that
choice. But it is critical to understand that the intuitive force of this
hypothetical—and of the allure of the Nobel Prize—is the tendency to
139

Adler and Posner bracket the question of whether an idealized set of
preferences should be understood to include full information—and by our argument,
rationality—only up to an individual‟s cognitive limits, or whether we should
envision an entirely informed human being. ADLER & POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS,
supra note 10, at 38. For our purposes the difference is irrelevant; what matters is
that the individual‟s preferences should be adjusted to some significant extent to
reflect her actual objectives.
140
See Argyle, supra note 43, at 359-62.
141
They might prefer it for altruistic reasons involving the value to others of the
scientific breakthroughs, but that (like the squirrel‟s survival) is not a part of their
welfare beyond the extent to which they know about it and are made happy by it.
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believe that there must be some additional hedonic benefit to be had
from such a tremendous achievement, some satisfaction or fulfillment
that the story does not capture. And that is precisely the point:
individuals concerned only with their own welfare seek
accomplishment and recognition because they believe that they will
feel differently after they have achieved these objectives, not because
of anything intrinsic to the objectives themselves. The objectives are
purely instrumental.
Second, even if some hypothetical scholars with full
information did in fact prefer Path B and the life of unhappy glory,
they would be doing so despite the fact that satisfaction of that
preference will not increase their welfare. That is to say, no rational,
idealized, self-interested, welfarist individual, per Adler and Posner‟s
account, could hold such a preference. The unhappy Nobel Laureate
might possess greater prestige, or greater moral character, or have
contributed more to the betterment of society than the scholar who
opts for family over career, but to say that he has greater well-being is
to reject the very conceptions of “self-interest” or “benefit” as Adler
and Posner employ them. What inherent value could success and
fame, or wealth,142 or the survival of the Sri Lankan squirrel, hold for
the self-interested welfare seeker if he does not experience and benefit
from them at some subjective level?
This point warrants one final example. Consider the Noble
Politician, who leads a country stricken by civil strife.143 Much like
the Driven Scholar, the Noble Politician is faced with a choice: she
can elect to pursue a modest career and live a life of comfort and
contentment (Path A), or she can devote herself to bringing peace to
her violence-torn nation at great personal cost to herself (Path B). By
following this latter path, the Noble Politician will accomplish great
things on behalf of her fellow citizens; but as with the Driven Scholar,
the former option will bring her greater individual happiness and
satisfaction.
We have already addressed this example, in general form, in
the preceding Part on the relationship between welfare and the “good
life.”144 There, we were at pains to acknowledge that altruism is
valuable due to its effect on others‟ subjective well-being, and perhaps
142

Adler & Posner, Happiness Research, supra note 112 (manuscript at 15).
We model this example after John Hume, one of the architects of the
Northern Ireland peace process, discussed in Nussbaum, supra note 69, at 22-23.
144
See Part II.B.3., supra.
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independently morally worthwhile as well. We expect—indeed, we
hope—that many people would prefer the altruistic path. But that
choice is not welfare-enhancing to the individual if it does not make
the altruist happier—which, by hypothesis, it does not.
Here, we go one step further. Like our subjective account of
welfare, Adler and Posner‟s restricted-preference framework would
view a preference for the difficult, altruistic life as welfarediminishing. Altruism, for all of its many virtues, is by definition not
self-interested.145 With altruism laundered from the calculation, Path
A confers greater individual benefit upon the Noble Politician than
Path B. Only a preference for Path A would survive the process of
preference-laundering.
Here, as with the Driven Scholar, the
requirement that preferences be both idealized and self-interested
eliminates from the welfare calculus any preference that the individual
will not herself experience as beneficial.
What then is left of the restricted-preferences account other
than subjective well-being? The answer, we submit, is nothing; the
two are perfectly isomorphic. A self-interested, restricted theory of
welfare demands that the individual actually receive some benefit
before one can say that her welfare has increased; 146 this conception of
“benefit” is rendered meaningless unless the individual actually
experiences the benefit.147 To claim otherwise—to argue that an
individual‟s welfare can improve without that improvement registering
subjectively—is to welcome Sheila and her Sri Lankan squirrel back
into the fold.
*

*

*

Individuals have many different types of preferences, including
ones that are self-interested, altruistic, and mistaken. Yet once those
preferences have been laundered to reflect only self-interest and
perfect information, as Adler and Posner advocate, they reduce to a
pure preference for improvement in subjective well-being.
145

Adler & Posner, Happiness Research, supra note 112 (manuscript at 5).
ADLER & POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS, supra note 10, at 34-35.
147
The argument is symmetric to Adler and Posner‟s claim, in opposition to a
virtue ethics view of welfare, that O1 cannot be better for an individual‟s welfare
than O2 if the individual never prefers O1 to O2. Id. at 32. Similarly, it is unsound to
speak of an increase in individual welfare that the individual never experiences as a
gain in subjective well-being.
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IV. TOWARD SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING ANALYSIS
The preference-based theory of modern welfare economics has
been so influential for so long in large part because it has generated a
number of methods for translating theory into policy-oriented practice.
The most prominent example is the use of cost-benefit analysis (CBA)
as a decision procedure to judge the likely effect of laws and policies
on well-being. In the past half century, CBA has become the linchpin
of the modern American administrative state,148 and many scholars
(including, prominently, Adler and Posner) have made considerable
contributions toward refining both the theory and practice of CBA.
Cost-benefit analysis is based upon the principle that wealth is
the best available proxy for welfare.149 If this were indeed the case,
then cost-benefit analysis would be the most logical choice of
governmental decision procedure. But as we have argued here,
welfare is better understood as subjective well-being. Moreover, there
exist good proxies for subjective well-being that do not rely on
measuring wealth. We thus believe that the time has come to replace
cost-benefit analysis with a new decision procedure based on
experienced well-being—well-being analysis (WBA).150
The
remainder of this paper takes the first steps toward creating and
defending that procedure.151 The science behind subjective well-being
is still young, and our aim here is only to sketch the outlines of a
decision tool that may soon become as robust as CBA. But we believe
148

See, e.g., Exec. Order 12,866 (requiring cost-benefit analysis of all regulatory

action).
149

See, e.g., Adler & Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 126,
at 180-81, 195.
150
Adler and Posner themselves suggest such a move: “Of course, one could
produce an alternative procedure that avoided dollars and instead used SWB
[subjective well-being] units as the common metric. Then the dollar effects of
projects would be transformed into SWB units rather than vice versa. There is no
reason in principle why such an alternative would not be adequate in a world where
the government advances SWB alone, but, as we have seen, researchers have not yet
come up with a plausible SWB-based decision procedure.” Adler & Posner,
Happiness Research, supra note 112 (manuscript 36). It is that plausible SWBbased decision procedure that we construct here.
151
For an example of another proposal for using reported well-being in public
policy, see Alan B. Krueger et al., National Time Accounting: The Currency of Life,
in MEASURING THE SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING OF NATIONS: NATIONAL ACCOUNTS OF
TIME USE AND WELL-BEING (Alan B. Krueger, ed. forthcoming), available at
http://www.nber.org/books/krue08-1.
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that the practical and theoretical hurdles WBA will confront are hardly
insuperable and no greater than those that CBA faces.
A.

Well-Being Analysis
1.

A Procedural Sketch

The procedure of a future WBA will likely owe much to the
techniques developed for CBA, and it will be helpful to describe
briefly the latter in order to better understand the strengths of the
former.152 CBA, as its name suggests, is meant to compare the costs
of some policy, law, or decision to the benefits that would accrue from
it. When the benefits outweigh the costs, the policy should be
implemented—at least insofar as the policymakers‟ goal is to increase
welfare. While this seems straightforward enough for market-based
transactions, it becomes substantially more complicated when the
costs and benefits to be compared are qualitatively distinct. How, for
example, should one compare the social and financial benefits of a
new civic center with the environmental and psychological costs of
increased traffic congestion? CBA‟s answer is monetization. Using
contingent valuation (CV) surveys, economists attempt to gauge the
amount of money that people would pay to receive the benefits and the
amount of money they would pay to avoid the costs.153 When the
former exceeds the latter, the policy is assumed to be welfare
maximizing.
As a theoretical matter this makes perfect sense. The research
from behavioral economics and hedonic psychology, however,
suggests that CBA faces significant empirical hurdles. As discussed
above, when people are asked to make predictions about the effects of
future experiences on their well-being, they tend to suffer from a
number of cognitive and emotional biases.154 Affective forecasting
errors, cognitive heuristics, and the like drive a wedge between (ex
152

For a robust description and defense of modern CBA, see ADLER & POSNER,
NEW FOUNDATIONS, supra note 10.
153
CV surveys ask a person how much she would be willing to pay (WTP) for
some desirable outcome, such as the construction of a public park, or how much she
would be willing to accept (WTA) in exchange for an undesirable one (e.g., the
destruction of the park). Although theoretically equivalent, the way the question is
framed substantially affects the valuation amount. See Russell Korobkin, The
Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (2003).
154
See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
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ante) predicted well-being and (ex post) experienced well-being.155
The attractiveness of WBA is based on the tighter link between
subjectively reported well-being and actual welfare.
Whereas CBA must convert the costs and benefits of a
proposed law or policy into discrete amounts of money, WBA relies
on a closer proxy for well-being—subjectively reported data on
moment-by-moment affect.156 We propose a decision procedure based
upon the measurement of momentary affect associated with policyrelevant experiences. Governments would measure and quantify the
likely hedonic effects of potential projects and policies and would
make decisions based upon those projected effects. Rather than
relying on wealth as a (weak) proxy for welfare, WBA provides
decision-makers with direct information about the welfare
consequences of a given proposal.
For example, a decision-maker might begin by comparing the
amount of time that people spend driving in traffic with their selfreported affect. If over the course of a day people who spend two
hours in traffic report their affect as two points lower (on a seven-point
scale)157 than people who spend one hour in traffic, we can say that a
second hour of driving in traffic results in the loss of 2 WBUs (wellbeing units). A proposal, such as a tax incentive for urban rather than
suburban living, that resulted in 1000 people taking an hour off of
their two-hour commutes would have a benefit of 2000 WBUs. Of
course, that same proposal might also diminish well-being because
people would be living in smaller houses. Downsizing from a 2500
square-foot house to a 1500 square-foot house might result in daily
reported well-being scores that are one point lower per person, leading
to a loss of 1000 WBUs for the relevant population. On these data, the
government should adopt the proposal (all else equal) because it
creates a net benefit of 1000 WBUs.158
Using momentary affect measures like the ones discussed
above, governments will be able to gauge the impact of manifold
experiences on reported well-being and convert these scores into
155

See Kahneman & Sugden, supra note 37, at 164.
To be clear, momentary affect is not a proxy for well-being; it is well-being.
Yet while the experiences of momentary affect equate with well-being, the data that
current survey methods generate can only serve as a proxy for it.
157
This might be, for example, a scale like the one presented in Pavot, supra
note 27, at 128.
158
Obviously a number of other costs and benefits would be involved in the
calculation. We simplify the example for the sake of clarity.
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WBUs of various durations. If a government were able to anticipate
all of the potential impacts of a project on individuals‟ well-being, it
could compute the aggregate WBU gain or loss. Although predicting
all of the well-being consequences of a law will be difficult, it can be
enhanced by research focusing on the effects of similar measures. For
example, the residents of a state might be surveyed both before and
after the enactment of a law that raised the minimum wage. If
reported well-being improved, we could say that, at least as a matter of
overall welfare, the bill was a success, and we might favor similar
measures in the future. Studies of the impact of state-by-state
adoption of no-fault divorce have already shown the value of such
research.159
Economists and psychologists have already learned a great deal
about the hedonic consequences of various activities160 and devised an
ever-growing set of policy proposals based upon those findings.161 It
is not unrealistic to believe that WBA may someday supplant CBA as
the leading decision procedure.
2.

Governmental Objectives and WBA Morality

The fact that governments may soon be capable of measuring
and aggregating subjective well-being does not answer the question of
precisely what governments should seek to achieve and, in particular,
what role distributional consequences should play. Much ink has been
spilled on the deep questions of morality raised by these issues. It is
well beyond the scope of this article to conduct a thoroughgoing
analysis of these questions or to reach many firm conclusions, and we
will not attempt such steps here. Rather, our objective is to set forth a
list of criteria that could form the basis for WBA-based government
159

See Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: Divorce Laws and Family Distress, 121 Q. J. ECON. 267 (2006).
160
See Kahneman et al., DRM, surpa note 33, at 1777; van Praag & Baarsma,
supra note 124, at 224.
161
See Andrew J. Oswald & Nattavudh Powdthavee, Death, Happiness, and the
Calculation of Compensatory Damages, 37 J. LEG. STUD. (forthcoming 2009)
(proposing the use of hedonic regression equations to calculate civil damages);
Christopher K. Hsee et al., Two Recommendations on the Pursuit of Happiness, 37 J.
LEG. STUD. (forthcoming 2009) (recommending investment in resources that are
resistant to adaptation and inherently evaluable); Jonathan Haidt et al., Hive
Psychology, Happiness, and Public Policy, 37 J. LEG. STUD. (forthcoming 2009)
(suggesting that “an increase in the availability of music, dance, and street festivals
should increase happiness and trust while decreasing alienation and crime”).
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policy. We take no position on how a government should balance
these competing concerns, with the exception of one instance that we
believe gives rise to a clear normative conclusion.
a) Aggregate Welfare
One conceivable objective of government is to maximize the
aggregate welfare of its citizens.162 A government might thus pursue
projects that increase the total WBUs of all individuals, aggregated
across the entire span of their lives. We take no position on the
importance of aggregate welfare in comparison to other measures or
goals, with one exception: a project that increases the subjective wellbeing of one or more individuals while leaving the welfare of the other
individuals unchanged is normatively desirable. (That is to say, WBA
satisfies the Pareto principle.163) We can think of no objection, at least
on welfarist grounds, to a project that will make some people better off
without harming the remainder.164
It is worth noting that this conclusion does not hold for
conventional CBA. A project that made some people wealthier
without altering the wealth of the remaining people might nonetheless
make those unaffected worse off. Inflation effects could diminish
their purchasing power and reduce the value of their money, or their
diminished status in comparison to their fellow citizens could make
them unhappy and reduce their welfare.165 These complications arise
because wealth is only a weak proxy for welfare. In contrast, if a
person‟s subjective well-being remains unchanged, that person‟s
welfare has not decreased.
b) Per-Capita Welfare
162

JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 12-13 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970) (“An action may be said
to be conformable to the principle of utility . . . (meaning with respect to the
community at large) when the tendency it has to augment the happiness of the
community is greater than any it has to diminish it.”).
163
See generally Adler & Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note
126, at 188.
164
There may of course be non-welfare reasons for opposing such a project. We
bracket them here.
165
See David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald, Well-Being Over Time in
Britain and the USA, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1359, 1378 (2004); Richard A. Easterlin, Will
Raising the Incomes of All Increase the Happiness of All? 27 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 35 (1995).
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Another conceivable objective of government is to maximize
the per capita welfare of its citizens, even at the expense of aggregate
welfare.166 Thus, a government might conceivably favor a project that
would produce a population of 1,000 people, each with 6 WBUs,
instead of a population of 1,550 people, each with 4 WBUs.167
c) Interpersonal Distribution
Another conceivable objective of government is to reduce the
interpersonal disparities of welfare among its citizens, even if it comes
at the expense of aggregate welfare.168 Thus, a government might
conceivably favor a project that would result in a population of 1,000
people, each with 5 WBUs, instead of a population of 550 people with
6 WBUs and 450 people with 4 WBUs.169
d) Intrapersonal/Intratemporal Distribution
Finally, another conceivable objective of government is to
reduce the intratemporal disparities of the welfare of its citizens, even
at the expense of aggregate welfare. Individuals might prefer stable
levels of happiness, just as economists suggest that individuals
rationally favor stable levels of consumption.170 Thus, a government
might conceivably favor a project that would ensure an individual 5
WBUs of welfare for the entire duration of her life, instead of that
individual spending the first half of her life at 6 WBUs and the second
half of her life at 4.2 WBUs.171
*
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*
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See e.g. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
We have in mind something like state-funded counseling for parents planning
on starting families.
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See JOHN BROOME, WEIGHING GOODS 192-200 (1991); FRED FELDMAN,
UTILITARIANISM, HEDONISM, AND DESERT 154-74 (1997).
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A progressive income tax might have this type of effect.
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For a review of research on how people value utilities at different times, see
Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review,
40 J. ECON. LIT. 351 (2002).
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We are at pains to reiterate that we take no position on which,
if any, of these four objectives are normatively legitimate aims of
government. We mean only to catalogue the types of objectives that a
government, guided by a WBA-based decision procedure, might
choose to pursue. Regardless of which goal or set of goals a
government elects, WBA will prove to be a powerful analytical tool.
B.

Objections

Having outlined the affirmative case for a decision procedure
based upon subjective well-being analysis, we proceed to confront the
four most important objections to this approach.172 We argue that
these objections are not insurmountable, and moreover, that they apply
with equal force to the leading alternative, cost-benefit analysis.
1.

Monetization

The first difficulty in implementing subjective well-being
analysis lies in “monetizing”—here, more appropriately
“hedonizing”—the value of various projects. If a federal agency is
proposing to construct a dam that will lower electricity prices but
simultaneously interfere with recreational fishing and create noise and
other nuisances, it may be difficult to translate the various effects of
the dam into workable social welfare units in order to compare costs
and benefits.173 Nonetheless, we believe that these types of problems
remain eminently solvable.
To begin with, these are purely empirical questions. As
psychologists accumulate data on hedonic responses to a diversity of
circumstances and stimuli, policy-makers will be able to reach ever
more precise estimations of the hedonic consequences of the various
aspects of a project. The task is no more theoretically daunting or
costly than collecting general census data; the government need only
deploy survey-takers and invite psychologists and economists to
analyze the resulting data. Indeed, large-scale efforts at collecting
general hedonic data such as the British Household Panel Survey and
the American General Social Survey are already underway, and
economists have gleaned substantial insights from even this unfocused
172

Adler and Posner raise these objections in Adler & Posner, Happiness
Research, supra note 112 (manuscript at 28).
173
Id. at 28.

Welfare as Happiness

52

information-gathering.174 Research targeted directly at potential
government projects will undoubtedly prove far more useful. For
example, studies of the well-being consequences of living with various
diseases are already having an effect on policies related to medical
decision-making.175
Moreover, traditional cost-benefit analysis suffers from the
same types of problems and is no better able to cope with them. It is
impossible to price the harm to recreational fishing or the annoyance
associated with construction noise without surveying the affected
populace,176 just as one might survey their hedonic attitudes; and there
is no reason to believe that contingent valuation data—which ask
people in the abstract how much they would be willing to pay to avoid
construction noise or to save a fishery—are easier to collect or more
reliable.177
174

See, e.g., Andrew J. Oswald & Nattavudh Powdthavee, Does Happiness
Adapt? A Longitudinal Study of Disability with Implications for Economists and
Judges, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1061 (2008); Lucas et al., supra note 44, at 527.
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See Peter A. Ubel et al., Misimagining the Unimaginable: The Disability
Paradox and Health Care Decision Making, 24 (No. 4 Suppl.) HEALTH PSYCHOL.
S57, S57 (2005).
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Hedonic price or wage methods can be used to estimate the price of harm in
some instances. For example, the value of the risk of increased injury on the job can
be evaluated by examining the wage premiums paid to workers in the industry. See
W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR
RISK (1992). However, hedonic price or wage methods, as an indirect means of
estimation, are subject to identification, multicollinearity, and information problems
that make it impossible to accurately value some things. See Robert W. Hahn &
John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Review and Synthesis, 8 YALE J.
REG. 233, 241-43 (1991).
177
See Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some
Number Better than No Number?, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 45 (1994) (discussing the
recurrent problems with contingent valuation surveys and providing an overview of
alternative explanations for the responses given in willingness-to-pay questions); see
also Robert H. Frank & Cass Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position,
68 U. CHI. L. REV. 323 (2001) (concluding that the positional and relative effects of
wealth cause measures of willingness to pay to systematically understate the benefits
of regulatory change). But see Thomas J. Kniesner & W. Kip Viscusi, Why Relative
Economic Position Does Not Matter: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 1
(2003) (arguing against the Frank and Sunstein proposal due to the practical
problems with identifying the relevant social reference group, the evidence that there
exist countervailing health and safety positional effects, and the probability that
increasing the estimated benefits from regulation by even 50 percent would not
ultimately change current regulatory evaluations because this increase would fall
within the typical range of possible outcomes already employed in real-world costbenefit analyses); W. Michael Hanemann, Valuing the Environment Through
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Indeed, WBA holds two advantages over typical CBA. First,
as we note above, there is a tighter theoretical connection between, for
instance, the nuisance caused by construction noise and an individual‟s
subjective well-being than between that same nuisance and an
individual‟s willingness to pay to be rid of it.178 After all, willingness
to pay is only a proxy for nuisance-related harm; the hedonic cost is
the actual relevant quantity. In order to arrive at willingness-to-pay
figures, the affected individual must first translate this expected
hedonic penalty into a monetary amount. WBA avoids the errors
associated with this translation. The comparative advantage of CBA is
that many of the costs and benefits of governmental projects are
already monetized. Decreases in the price of electricity, for instance,
are measured in dollars, while WBA would require that they be
translated into WBUs. However, economists have already begun to
assemble highly robust measures of wealth effects on subjective wellbeing,179 so this act of translation may soon become relatively simple.
Second, hedonic analyses, unlike contingent valuation studies,
are not hypothetical. Few individuals will ever be offered the
opportunity to trade small amounts of money for diminished
construction noise or slightly improved recreational fishing
opportunities; government regulation exists in large part because the
transaction costs of such arrangements are too high.180 Even when
individuals are forced into implicit tradeoffs—when the agency
decides not to construct the dam, for instance, and electricity prices do
not decline—the associations between costs and benefits are usually
too ephemeral to make post hoc judgments reliable.181 Contingent
valuation studies are thus forced to rely primarily on laboratory-based
hypothetical questions regarding hypothetical payments to forestall
hypothetical projects.
By contrast, hedonic analyses compare
Contingent Valuation, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 19 (1994) (claiming that properly
administered contingent valuation surveys can produce stable, replicable, and valid
responses).
178
See Part IV.A.1., supra.
179
Oswald & Powdthavee, supra note 200, at 1061.
180
See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 111115 (1972); Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communication Commission, 2 J. LAW &
ECON. 1, 29 (1959).
181
See Diamond & Hausman, supra note 203, at 45 (discussing the recurrent
problems with contingent valuation surveys and providing an overview of alternative
explanations for the responses given in willingness-to-pay questions).
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individuals‟ actual levels of happiness before and after an actual
project is completed. It may of course be difficult to isolate the
hedonic effects of the project itself among all of the possible
confounding variables, but sophisticated multivariate regression has
already proven equal to the task on many occasions.182 Consequently,
WBA may ultimately hold substantial empirical advantages over
traditional CBA.
2.

Interpersonal Comparisons

The second potential pitfall for WBA is the difficulty in
making interpersonal comparisons. If two people both rate their
happiness at 6 on a 7-point scale, there is no way to be certain that
they are actually experiencing equivalent levels of hedonic well-being.
Similarly, if a government project will move Person A‟s average
moment-by-moment well-being from 6 to 7 and Person B‟s from 6 to
5.5, it is impossible to know whether Person A‟s welfare has in fact
improved more than Person B‟s has diminished.183 If WBA is to rely
on a summing of individual welfare states, it will be difficult to
compare the pre-project total of 12 with the post-project total of 12.5
absent a consistent interpersonal standard. This problem may not
easily succumb to technological solution. Without the capacity to
physiologically measure happiness (using fMRI technology, for
instance), third parties will be unable to observe an individual‟s true
level of subjective well-being.
At the same time, this issue should only mildly concern
policymakers analyzing large-scale projects. Individuals may respond
slightly idiosyncratically to happiness surveys, but across large
populations—hundreds or thousands of people—these small
interpersonal differences should tend to wash out. There is no a priori
reason to believe that particular American demographic groups
respond to hedonic surveys in particular ways. Variations among
individuals in how they rate their own happiness—what they mean
when they rate themselves a 5 or a 6, for instance—are likely to be
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See Oswald & Powdthavee, supra note 200; Lucas et al., supra note 44.
Adler and Posner, Happiness Research, supra note 112 (manuscript at 28-
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random, not biased.184 Large numbers of survey responses should
successfully mitigate these discrepancies.185
Most important, cost-benefit analysis is equally subject to this
criticism. Because of the diminishing marginal value of money, two
individuals with differing levels of personal wealth can obtain vastly
different amounts of welfare from the same gain (or loss) of income.186
Adjusting CBA in accordance with variations in marginal values of
money is quite technically complex, and the proper solution is
frequently unclear or highly context-dependent.187 The problems for
CBA do not end there. Even two equivalently wealthy individuals
may have vastly divergent welfare functions—additional wealth might
benefit one far more than the other. Individuals‟ welfare functions are
unobservable;188 economists know (or assume) that marginal values of
money are positive and diminish with increasing wealth, but they can
be sure of little else.189 Economists typically respond to this problem
184
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by simply assuming that its effects dissipate across large
populations190—precisely the approach we advocate for WBA. It is
thus hard to imagine that interpersonal comparisons will present
greater difficulty for WBA than they do for classical CBA.
3.

Aggregation

A third possible obstacle for WBA lies in the ambiguities
involved in aggregating interpersonal welfare states. For instance, if
Person A‟s welfare decreases from 6 to 5 and the welfare of Persons B
through Z increases from 6 to 6.1, it is difficult to know whether this
net gain of 1.5 WBUs191 actually indicates that overall welfare has
increased, decreased, or remained constant.192
This objection has two components. The first is simply a
repetition of the interpersonal comparison problem discussed above: it
is impossible to know whether a hedonic improvement for Person B
from 6 to 6.1 is of equivalent magnitude to a hedonic regression for
Person B from 6 to 5.9. We have already addressed this question. The
second component is the argument that a weak welfarist cannot
conclude that a project is worth pursuing from the fact that overall
welfare has increased if some people will be better off and others
worse off. This claim is certainly correct, but it is identical to the
problems faced by CBA or any other wealth-based decision procedure.
The simple fact that a project will result in Person A receiving $100
and Person B losing $50 is not sufficient reason to undertake the
project in light of distributional issues and other considerations beyond
aggregate welfare.193 This is merely another way of stating that there
likely possible in only very limited circumstances. See, e.g., John C. Harsanyi,
Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility,
63 J. POL. ECON. 309, 315-19 (1955) (“[E]ach individual has a utility function of his
own, expressing his own individual taste . . . . In general, the greater the
psychological, biological, cultural, and social differences between two people, the
greater the margin of error attached to comparisons between their utility.”).
190
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is no independent moral or normative significance to Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency, which is by now a well-accepted conclusion among
economists.194
In the preceding section we outlined a set of potential moral
criteria for evaluating projects based on WBA, criteria that include
aggregate welfare, per capita welfare, and distribution-adjusted
aggregate welfare.195 There is little more to be said on that topic here;
suffice it to add that the unarguable difficulties in negotiating between
those various criteria are no greater for WBA than they are for CBA.
4.

Intertemporal Compensation

The final important objection to WBA relates to hedonic
compensations in Period 2 for events that occurred in Period 1.
Imagine that an individual has been injured in a car accident, causing
her average moment-by-moment well-being to fall from 6 to 5 for a
period of one year.196 (It then returned to 6.) Imagine that there were
two potential methods of compensating her for her injury: Plan A
would raise her well-being from 6 to 7 for one year, and Plan B would
raise her well-being from 6 to 6.5 for two years. An objector might
argue that it is unclear whether either of these plans would compensate
her appropriately. Depending upon the relationship between her
survey responses and her actual well-being, and upon how she values
the well-being of each of her various temporal selves, either Plan A or
Plan B might over- or under-compensate her.
Upon examination it becomes evident that this objection again
reduces to a combination of two arguments we have already
addressed. The issue of whether a decline from 6 to 5 is of equivalent
magnitude to an improvement from 6 to 7 (or twice that of an
improvement from 6 to 6.5) is merely an intrapersonal variant on the
quandary regarding interpersonal comparisons and the shape of
194
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hedonic curves.197 We have already dealt with this question and
shown that it is, if anything, more easily handled than the parallel
problems surrounding CBA. Similarly, the intertemporal problem—
whether a gain in Period 2 effectively counterbalances a loss in Period
1—is an intrapersonal variant on the question of interpersonal
aggregation and the moral significance of overall welfare.198 We have
addressed this question as well.
*

*

*

We do not mean to overstate the ease with which agencies and
other decision-makers could implement subjective well-being analysis.
The science of hedonic well-being remains in its infancy, and the type
of detailed theoretical framework that surrounds CBA does not yet
exist for WBA. This Article is an initial step in the direction of
supplying such a new framework. But it is worth noting, even at this
early stage, that none of the objections to WBA is insurmountable, and
none is more daunting than similar questions that have plagued CBA.
If there is a reason to suspend the exploration of WBA as a decision
procedure, we have not yet found it.
CONCLUSION
Economists, philosophers, and lawyers have long agreed that
one of government‟s foremost responsibilities is to improve the
welfare of its citizens. But they have disagreed vehemently over the
best conception of welfare. Some have argued for a vision of welfare
defined by the satisfaction of preferences, whereas others have
promoted a theory of welfare based on objectively good acts. In this
article we reject these two leading theories. We demonstrate instead
that an individual‟s welfare is best understood as her subjective wellbeing—how she feels, and how much happiness she experiences. No
other conception of welfare accords as well with our intuitions and our
knowledge of human behavior.
Policymakers have long treated cost-benefit analysis as the
preeminent decision procedure, and CBA is now firmly ensconced
within the modern regulatory state. But CBA only makes sense as the
methodological tool of first resort if wealth is the best available proxy
197
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for welfare. Hedonic psychology demonstrates that it is not.
Psychologists have developed excellent proxies for measuring and
studying subjective well-being directly, proxies that hold theoretical
and empirical advantages over CBA. Because welfare is best
understood as subjective well-being, and because it is now possible to
measure subjective well-being directly, we argue that governments
and policymakers should explicitly adopt a decision procedure based
upon subjective well-being—well-being analysis. Well-being analysis
is, without question, in its infancy. Nevertheless, we view it as the
future of measuring the quality of human life.

